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part of the insurer to wait until alter the body of the de ceased had been interred, and nothing appears in the evidence to show any excuse for it, if it was deemed that an examination of the body was necessary. From Septem ber 4th until September gth an opportunity was afforded for an examination of the body, and, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, we must assume that the im mediate notice conceded to have been given of the death left an ample margin of time for such an examination."

The court cite no cases in point, but the precise question was decided in the same way in Grangers' Life Ins. Co. 7'. Brown, 57 Miss. 308; 34 Am. Rep. 446, which was relied on by the court below. See Browne's Short Studies in Evidence, pp. 34, 35.

DOG LAWS. — Shakespeare said: "The dog will have his day." (Some commentators have conjec tured that "day" is a misprint for •• bay," the latter word being more consonant with the first part of the line, " The cat will mew"; but there was certainly a common proverb that " every dog will have his day.") The United States Supreme Court recently flew in the face of this proverb, in their decision in Sentell v. New Orleans, etc. R. Co. The plaintiff was the owner of a valuable registered Newfoundland bitch, which he kept for breeding purposes. While follow ing him on the streets of the city, she stopped on the track of the Railroad Company, and not observing the approach of an electric car, and moreover " being in a delicate state of health and not possessed of her usual agility, she was caught by the car and instantlykilled." Sentell sued the railroad company in a Dis trict Court and recovered $250 damages. On appeal the Court of Appeals reversed the judgment, holding that Sentell should have shown a compliance with the State laws and city ordinance regarding dogs. A Louisiana statute provides that dogs are only to be regarded as personal property when duly recorded upon the assessment-rolls. Mr. Sentell's dog was not so recorded, and the principal question was of the constitutionality of that statute. In affirming the judgment of the Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court, through Mr. Justice Brown, who wrote the opinion, declared property in dogs at common law to be of an imperfect or qualified nature. They are not to be considered as being on the same plane with horses,

cattle and sheep, in which the right of property is perfect and complete, but rather in the category of cats, monkeys, parrots, singing birds, and similar animals, kept for pleasure, curiosity or caprice. In other words, they have no intrinsic value, common to all dogs and independent of the particular breed or individual. But the court considers it practically im possible by statute to distinguish between the differ ent breeds, or between the valuable and the worthless, and therefore all legislation on the subject, though nominally including the whole canine race, is really directed against the latter class, and based upon the theory that the owner of a really valuable dog will feel sufficient interest in him to comply with any reasonable regulation designed to distinguish him from the common herd. The court observed : — "Although dogs are ordinarily harmless, they preserve some of their hereditary wolfish instincts, which occasion ally break forth in the destruction of sheep and other helpless animals. Others, too small to attack these animals, are simply vicious, noisy, and pestilent. As their depreda tions are often committed at night, it is usually impossible to identify the dog or to fix the liability on the owner, who, moreover, is likely to be pecuniarily irresponsible. In short, the damages are such asare beyond the reach of judicial process, and legislation of a drastic nature is necessary to protect persons and property from annoyance and destruc tion. Such legislation is clearly within the police power of the State. While these regulations (in Louisiana') are more than ordinarily stringent, and might be declared to be unconstitutional if applied to domestic animals generally, there is nothing in them of which the owner of a dog has any legal right to complain. The statute really puts a premium upon valuable dogs by giving them a recognized position, and by permitting the owner to put his own esti mate upon them. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed."

This decision may give some shock to sentimental ideas concerning the standing of Lo's " faithful dog," but this mundane sphere is not an •• equal sky" for dog and man. The Chairman rejoices over it when he recalls how his neighbor's worthless little pug rushes out in the street and snaps at his helpless calves as he is mounted on his bicycle, and cannot kick with safety. Certainly, if society has the lawful power to require human beings to take out a license to get married, or to keep a dog, or to make regis tration of conditional sales of personal property, it has the right to enact the statute in question.