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 The Lawyer's Rasy Chair. that of a man who once called to consnlt a great authority on massage, residing in Carlsbad. He said he could not sleep. The doctor said : " You don't look like a man troubled with insomnia. How much do you contrive to sleep?" " Well, I generally sleep from about eleven till seven." " Eight hours! isn't that enough?" " Well, but Doctor, I can't sleep in the daytime!" That is just the difficulty with the Chairman — he can't sleep after six o'clock, A. M. The cause is the crowing of neighboring cocks. His neighbors in the rear keep roosters, some of which are expert in crowing and others are learning. The efforts of the latter remind him of the first attempts of a boy to whistle. It must be allowed, however, that these beginners are showing improvement, under assiduous practice, although they begin so early that their voices are hoarse with the dampness. One of these youngsters has a peculiar circumflex accent in his note that is extremely annoying. It is probably a birthmark. He is always the first on deck, and persists until he rouses his sleepy elders. He evidently regards that as smart, in this respect resembling a human baby. Then these birds hold dialogues with others near and far. Professor Garner, perhaps, could tell what they say, but we cannot, for their discourse is as unintelligible to us as one of those polyglot and penticostal operas in which the performers sing respectively in Italian, French and C.erman. The whole performance is the more annoy ing to us because we never eat eggs, and we try hard never to eat a rooster. This untimely cock-crowing marks the foolishness of early rising, for the cock is notoriously a brainless fowl and the silliest animal in creation — just the creature to get up early and disturb his neighbors' sleep. We have had very serious thoughts about an endeavor to suppress this nuisance, and have wondered whether the courts would listen to an application for an injunction, or whether we have a right to take the law into our own hand, as in the case of a nocturnally howling dog, and suppress these feathered pests by some species of seductive poison. Have residents of a large city any right to keep roosters, or are we one of those abnormally nervous and sensitive persons for whom the law makes no allowance? We only wish we could shoot straight, or that the classic custom of sacrificing cocks to Esculapius might be restored, for there are many physicians living in our neigborhood.

NOTES OF CASESSELLING LAUDANUM то ANOTHER'S WIFE. — An almost unprecedented case is Holleman v. Harvard, 119 N. C. 150; 34 L. R. A. 803, in which it was held that the sale of laudanum as a beverage to a married woman, knowing that it is destroying her

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mind and body and causing loss to her husband, when continued after his repeated warnings and pro test, renders the seller liable to him for the damages which he sustains on account of the loss of her serv ices. The Court said : — "The action is a novel one. With the exception of the case of Hoard v. Peck, 56 Barb. 202, which, in its most important aspects, resembles the one before us, we have been al)le to find no precedent in the Knglish common-law courts or in the courts of any of our States. It does not follow, however, that because the case is new the action cannot be maintained. If a principle upon which to base an action exists, it can be no good objection that the case is a new one. It is contended for the defendants, though, that there is no principle of the common law upon which this action can be sustained, and that our own statutory law gives no such remedy as the plaintiff seeks in this action for the wrong done to him by the defendants, and that the novelty of the action, together with the silence of the ele mentary books on the subject-matter of the complaint, while not conclusive, furnishes strong countenance to their con tention. It is claimed for the defendants that while in the abstract such facts as are stated in the complaint would make the parties charged guilty of a great moral wrong, there would be no legal liability incurred therefor. It was argued for the defendants that there was no legal obligation resting upon themselves not to sell the drug, as is alleged, to the plaintiffs wife, or upon the wife not to use it; that many of the ancient restrictions upon the rights of married women had been repealed by recent legislation, or modified by a more liberal judicial construction; that a married wom an was ordinarily free to go where she would, and that the husband could not arbitrarily deprive her of her liberty, nor use violence against her under any circumstances, except in self-defense, and that, if he could not restrain her locomo tion and her will, he could not prevent her from buying the drug and using it; that the wife's duty to honor and obey her husband, to give to their children motherly care, to render all proper service in the household, and to give him her companionship and love, was a moral duty, but that they could not be enforced by any power of the law, if' the wife refused to discharge them. But notwithstanding the claim of the defendants, we think this action rests upon a principle, — a principle not new, but one sound and consis tent. The principle is this: 'Whoever does an injury to another is liable in damages to the extent of that injury. It matters not, whether the injury is to the property, or the person, or the rights, or the reputation, of another.' Story, J., in Dexter v. Spear, 4 Mason, 115. And also in the third book of Blackstone's Commentaries (chap. 8, p. 123) it is written: 'Wherever the common law gives a right, or pro hibits an injury, it also gives a remedy, by action.' A mar ried woman still owes to her husband, notwithstanding her greatly improved legal status, the duty of companionship, and of rendering all such services in his home as her rela tions of wife and mother require of her. The husband, as a matter of law, is entitled to her time, her wages, her earn ings, and the product of her labor, skill and industry. He may contract to furnish her services to others, and may sue for them, as for their loss, in his own name. And it seems to be a most reasonable proposition of law that whoever