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was one for which a life-sentence went to the extreme limit of the law, and was almost unparalleled in its severity, why should he declare that he had come " most emphati cally " to the conclusion that it ought not to be interfered with? Or why should he say that he had as little intention of releasing the prisoner as his immediate predecessor had, avoiding all reference to the Home Secretary, who originally passed the sentence, and who most probably did intend to modify it, like the similar sentences which he passed on unfortunate child-murderesses? Prisoners of this kind usually receive a life-sentence from the Home Secretary and are set free in seven years at the utmost. It was generally thought that Mrs. Maybrick's sentence was of the same kind, until Sir M. W. Ridley declared the contrary in the House of Commons. But now that the life-sentence in her case is declared not to be a matter of precedent and routine, but one to be carried out to the full extent usual in such cases (for if an English "lifer" lives long enough he or she is ultimately released), we have a right to demand, what offense punishable by penal servitude for life has been established with perfect conclusiveness? And if penal servitude for life is the maxi mum sentence for the crime in question, we have a right to ask further, why, and by what authority, has this extreme penalty been imposed? In England, a jury is the proper tribunal to decide questions as to the prisoner's innocence or guilt in respect of any specified crime; and, except in the case of the conviction for murder, where the laws compel the judge to pass sentence of death, the judge who presides at the trial is the proper person to fix the penalty. Is Mrs. Maybrick being punished for any crime of which she was convicted by the jury? Was her present sentence deliberately passed on her for that crime by the judge who pre sided at the trial? And, if so, did it exceed the legal penalty for the crime of which she was thus convicted?

NOTE. — The opinions of the eminent counsel to which reference is made in the report of the committee, which received the endorsement of the Medico-Legal Society, are appended : — "Re MRS. F. E. MAYBRICK.

"Having carefully considered the facts in the elaborate case submitted to us by Messrs. Lumley and Lumley, and the law applicable to the mat ter, we are clearly of the opinion that there is no mode by which in this case a new trial, or a veñire iff novo, can be obtained, nor can the pris oner be brought up on a habeas corpus with the view of retrying the issue of her innocence or guilt. "We say this notwithstanding the case of Re gina v. Scaife (17 Q. В., 238; 5 Cox С. С., 243, and 2 Drew С. С. 281). We are of the opinion that in English criminal procedure there is no possibility of procuring a rehearing in the case of felony where a verdict has been found by a prop erly constituted jury upon an indictment which is correct in form. This rule is, in our opinion, absolute unless circumstances have transpired, and have been entered upon the record, which, when there appearing, would invalidate the tri bunal and reduce the trial to a nullity by reason of its not having been before a properly consti tuted tribunal. None of the matters proposed to be proved go to this length. "We think it right to add that there are many matters stated in the case, not merely with refer ence to the evidence at and the incidents of the trial, but suggesting new facts which would be matters proper for the grave consideration of a court of criminal appeal if such a tribunal ex isted in this country. (Signed) C. RURSELL. J. FLETCHER MOULTON. HARRY BODKIN POLAND. REGINALD J. SMITH. LINCOLN'S INN, 12 April, 1892." "A? MRS. F. E. MAYBRICK. "I agree with my learned friends that the evi dence at the trial of this case did not justify the verdict, and I further think that this is a case where every possible means of procuring a re hearing should be resorted to; but I am unable at the present period of English law to assent to their proposition that in a case of felony, even if it is assumed that there is an innocent woman in an English prison, the rules of criminal procedure debar the courts from applying any remedy unless some error making the trial itself a nullity can be shown to exist on the record; and 1 moreover