Page:The Green Bag (1889–1914), Volume 09.pdf/126

 Beyond a Reasonable Doubt. decision who theorizes as little as possible and works for a unanimous vote. But it is not the business of the jury indi vidually or collectively to be satisfied abso lutely. They are merely to be satisfied be yond a reasonable doubt. They arc to reach what is called a moral certainty, a theory which makes all other theories appear to be unreasonable. That is not a mathematical certainty. Two and two make four. But this assertion is made only with regard to this present universe. There are said to be mathematicians who imagine that in some other possibly conceivable universe that might not be true. Hence, even in mathe matics of a rudimentary degree, assertions of established fact are made within certain de fined limits. The moral certainty aimed at by a jury is within the confines of the evidence submitted to it in the case then at bar. Their heads may be big or little, full or empty, but they are to do as well as they can with the evidence which is actually before them, and not to imagine what might have happened. Doubts which are not raised by that evidence are not relevant and, whether reasonable or not, may be dismissed. This disposes of a good deal of the ordinary ac tivity of the doubter who doubts for the pleasure of it. The special knowledge of the sailor is of use as information, but has to be controlled by the jury's estimate of the wit nesses to such points. The man who is most attentive to details sometimes loses his head about the meaning of the whole case. The man who remembers everything which he at tends to does not always attend to the chief things. The judge of human nature is not always a good reasor.er, and the reasoner frequently needs to be held down to earth by every other sensible man present. Take these men working together in their several ways, and they inevitably find themselves relying upon one another. In coming to a mutual understanding as to what the chief parts of the evidence are, they disclose themselves to

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each other at the same time. Each man has an opportunity to feel his own weakness as well as his own strength. Therefore, when this one and that one asks himself whether his doubts are reasonable he is prepared with a more or less open mind to entertain the views of others about his own thoughts. Then, under such circumstances, when twelve men agree that they are collectively and in dividually convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the prisoner is guilty, their ver dict may be entirely sincere. Nor is their sincerity to be suspected merely because one or more of them expresses afterwards doubts which return upon him. In the absence of his fellow jurymen who with him had heard all the evidence, the arguments and the in structions of the court, it is to be expected that a vacillating, or forgetful, or timid per son will yield to the assertions and arguments of outsiders as he yielded to those to whom it was his nature to yield when on the jury. Such mental traits are as honest in their operation as the bolder peculiarities which urge men to be more confident of the truth of their verdict after than before it is ren-. dered. A doubt may be roughly defined as a thought that another thought may be er roneous. In civil cases the jurymen do not have to rack their brains with such self-ex amination. There it is what they believe a preponderance of the evidence proves, which they must find conclusive, even if reasonable doubts remain unanswered. But in criminal cases the personal equation is distinctly rec ognized in each juror, and each juror is to consider the person o£ the prisoner sur-. rounded by the invisible armor of reason. A foolish doubt is no more sacred in the juryroom than any foolish thought. A doubt that ignores the evidence or any part of it is .of no more consequence than a dogmatic theory that is equally baseless. What is rea sonable, however, has to be determined not once for all, but in each separate case. Some juries are more reasonable than others, but