Page:The Green Bag (1889–1914), Volume 09.pdf/122

 Beyond a Reasonable Doubt.

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BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT. BY CHARLES E. GRINNELL. RECENT popular discussions about the conduct of juries, in cases celebrated for the enormity of crimes requiring the most thorough examination, have increased the interest of people of all classes in the jury as an institution. One of the favorite topics for argument is what doubts are suf ficiently reasonable to prevent a verdict. Nor is it surprising that there should be much difference of opinion especially among dis putants neither shut up in a box together, nor constantly instructed as to the limits within which they are to think. It is pretty generally understood, however, that to judge of the evidence one should have heard all of it and the witnesses. Jurors are judges of fact, and it is worth while to consider their judicial difficulties. A judge has the advan tage of a poet, for the judge is both born and made. A clear mind is a gift of nature, but that may be clarified. Experience which is reflected upon, learning which is digested, original ideas, especially if criticized by himself, and the feelings which control him, or are mastered by him, all contribute to that power of forming opinions as to what shall be done which is known as good judg ment. People differ about particular opin ions or decisions of this or that judge, but there is apt to be a pretty general agree ment among those who know well a good judge, or his opinions, that he is fit for his task. They agree in this estimate because they are to certain degrees like him. He represents instincts which they share. There are judges in all kinds of life. But in the courts of law the judicial character is most conspicuously developed. It is highly trained upon the bench, and there is a con stant training in the jury of judges of fact. In civil cases men chosen from many occu

pations and different ranks of life work to gether, without a very great strain, to dis cover what upon the whole is the thing to do in view of what the preponderance of the evidence proves. But in criminal cases where they are instructed that the prosecu tion must prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt, the jury have added to their task one which is in some respects equal to that of the prosecuting officer. They are thereby required to criticize their own judgment, and hence to doubt what they believe to have been proved. Twelve men may be con vinced by the evidence that a prisoner did the act with which he is charged, but the questions of what doubts there are, and which of such doubts are reasonable, neces sarily divide them at least for a time. Each man is thus bound to ask himself, Am I in this case a good judge of fact? Good judges whether of law or of fact, of literature, of horses, or of machinery, habit ually try to come to opinions which are free from reasonable doubts. So far as possible under the circumstances in which they are, they strive to learn all things which belong to the problems before them, to appreciate those things, to get their meaning, and to subject their minds to the influence of it all, so that a state of mind may result which shall be not a mere arbitrary act of will, but an impartial opinion wrought by the facts of the case upon the disinterested intellect. A desire to learn the truth is a wish to learn something beyond a reasonable doubt. The habit of thorough study is the habit of try ing to learn something beyond a reasonable doubt. The natural disposition to abide in a conviction which we have thus reached after we have got to what we call " practical-/ ly" the bottom of a subject, is the habit of