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upon a certain event. The distinction between them is clear, and it has been adopted, so far as we can discover, in every case in which the question has been raised in this country (Alvord v. Smith, 63 Ind. 58; Porter v. Day, 71 Wis. 296; De Lier v. Plymouth Co. Agr. Soc. 27 Iowa, 481; see, also, Costcllo v. Curtis, 30 Weekly Dig. 20). No one would dream that the offering of a premium upon the result of a rowing match or for a contest in oratory was gambling within the plain meaning of the words, as they had been understood before the passage of the con stitutional amendments. Neither was it ever suggested that the numerous prizes which are offered for excellence in draft horses, or saddle horses, or for one who turns the best furrow, are obnoxious to the prohibition of the Con stitution, and yet these offers stand upon precisely the same footing, and are within the same principles as the offer of the premium or prize to be competed for by the racing of animals. The fact that the owner of each horse who proposes to compete in the race is required to pay an entrance fee, does not make the transaction a bet or a gambling transaction. The money is paid for the privilege. When paid it becomes the absolute property of the associa tion. The person paying it under no circumstances can have it again, and whether he wins or loses, or, indeed, whether his horse competes or not, is a matter of no im portance, for in no event is the money to be returned to him. He simply pays a certain sum for the privilege of competing, and that sum so paid is not to be returned to him in any event, and he has no claim upon it after it once becomes the property of the association." This decision is supported by Misner v. Knapp, 13 Oregon, 279; 57 Am. Rep. 6; but Comly v. Hillegas, 94 Penn. St. 132; 39 Am. Rep. 774, is to the contrary.

Women as Lawyers. — In Ricker's Petition, 66 N. H. 207, just published, it was held that a woman may be an attorney-at-law. The case was argued for the petitioner by Miss Lelia J. Robinson, now dead, and the opinion was given by the late Chief-Justice Doe, six years ago. The opinion is one of the Chiefs old-timers, covering some fifty pages, and consists largely in extracts from other judges' sayings. Much of it is devoted to consideration of the question whether a lawyer is a public officer — which the Court answer in the negative. We have stated above the substance of the head-note. But the opinion closes with this: "When the petitioner furnishes the evi dence required by the rules, the question of her ad mission to examination will be considered." What! all over again? This volume contains another opin ion by Doe, C. J., covering nearly thirty pages. Car penter, J., also emits one of thirty-two pages, on a little question of challenge of juror for precon ceived opinion. A large part of this volume is given up to arguments in full of counsel, covering thirty pages in one case.

Previous Chaste Character. — In Norton v. State, 72 Miss. 128, it was held that, although not in terms so provided, it is essential to the offense of seduction under promise of marriage that the woman be unmarried and of chaste character at the time of the intercourse. This is founded on the fact that the statute punishing seduction of girls under sixteen requires that they shall be "of previous chaste character." The Court say : "Can it be possible that the legislature meant that the girl under sixteen should be required to show ' previous chaste char acter,' but the experienced nymph du pavement" ("French of atte-Bowe") " not? That the prosti tute can invoke the vindicating power of the law on terms more favorable to success than the girl under sixteen? When Mrs. Quickly conceals from the lad who sails between Sir Jack's ' East and West Indies ' the contents of the notes, on the ground it is not well children should know any wickedness, we have the great master of human nature raising into relief the truth universally recognized that childhood is, in the estimation of even the most hardened, the period of purity; and when we have the Supreme Court of Wisconsin telling us, ' If Joseph Andrews had yielded to the salacious solicitations of Lady Booby, as she lay naked in her bed, he would have been guilty of debauching her person, but certainly not of corrupting her mind,' we have presented to our consciousness the other picture of the woman long past childhood with chastity gone."

Demonstrative Evidence. — A literal example of this may be found in Ellis v. Denman Thompson, 93 Hun. 606. That was an action by a playwright against the celebrated actor for breach of contract to act his play, "Rich and Poor." The defendant had contracted to produce the play in proper form, and "to play it continuously if there was a reasonable success attending its production," and to pay the plaintiff a certain amount. The defendant played it only twice, and then abandoned it on the ground that it failed of success. On the trial the plaintiff offered evidence as to how the play was received by the audiences and the newspapers, and of the character of the criticisms, and as to whether the actors were called before the curtain and how many times, and whether the audiences applauded and how often. All this was excluded, and defendant had judgment. This is now reversed by the Supreme Court on the ground of the exclusion of this evidence. The Court say, " This was clearly proper evidence." Of course it was, just as clearly as would have been evidence that the audiences hissed and the newspapers jeered at the play.