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Luna, and led a nocturnal chorus.5 It would seem that it was the unlawful combi nation and conspiracy which made the bark ing especially reprehensible in the latter case. The law appears to recognize a dis tinction between barking and biting, in that, while biting is always unlawful, — at least where the bitc£ is human, — barking is not malum in sc, but only becomes reprehen sible when accompanied by circumstances of aggravation, such as the combination and conspiracy just noted, or the frightening of a horse, etc. It seems also that the circum stances of aggravation must grow out of or be closely connected with the barking. It is not enough that they merely accompany the barking. An example of this is the de facement of the freshly painted steps noted above. There the injury did not properly arise out of the barking, nor was it in strict ness connected therewith. As the courts of Michigan issue injunctions against the use of profanity, even on one's own prem ises, the case of the owner of the steps in question would seem to be one of injuria absque damtio. In discussing the rights and liabilities of persons having to do with dogs, our author will meet with many interesting questions. In the first place, he will find it laid down that the law has no respect for the charac teristics and prejudices of dogs.6 But this statement must be taken with some qualifi cation, for the same court has held that it is contributory negligence to pull a dog's tail.7 On the other hand, it is not con tributory negligence to offer candy to a dog, nor to step on a dog in the course of a scuffle with "a third party."8 Nor is it contributory negligence to take a dog by 6 Hubbard v. Parsons, 90 Mich. 221. 0 Boulester v. Parsons, 16 i Mass. 182. ' Raymond v. Hodgson, 161 Mass. 184.

the collar for the purpose of preserving the peace and rescuing a dog " rightfully in the plaintiff's custody."9 But the court wisely suggest that a great deal must depend in such cases on the size and disposition of the dogs. In Massachusetts the county is made liable to owners of sheep for damage done to their sheep by dogs, and the county may recover over from the harborers of the dogs. Under this statute a peculiar case arose where the dog of the owner of the sheep conspired with divers dogs of the de fendants to worry his master's sheep, and in pursuance of such conspiracy, aided and abetted by the dogs of the defendants, did kill one or more sheep of his master of great value (of course). The defendants were held liable to the county for the dam age, the rule being, apparently, that the cussedness of the dog is not to be imputed to his master so as to preclude a recovery for the damage done by his co-conspirators.10 Many other points might be noticed. But I trust enough has been said to indi cate the field which lies open for some industrious author and enterprising pub lisher. The profession will wait impatiently for a Treatise on Canine Jurisprudence. I cannot hope for the honor of a dedication, which will be reserved for some eminent occupant of the bench. May I hope that these suggestions will be rewarded by a presentation copy of the two volumes when issued? I fear not, such is human ingrati tude, unless I can outdo the regular writers of testimonials and reviews for circular pub lication, and furnish the enterprising pub lisher aforesaid quid pro quo. 8 Lynch v. McNally, 73 N. Y. 347; Fake v. Addicks, 45 Minn. 37. u Matterson -'. Strong, 159 Mass. 497. 10 Worcester v. Ashworth, 160 Mass. 186.