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 Dogs and The Law. em conditions. The barbarous doctrines of the common law which did not make dog-stealing larceny will come in for vigor ous invective. A suggestion may be made also by which our author may profit in pre paring his historical chapter. We learn from Sir Henry Maine that Canine Juris prudence had attained such development in old Irish law that a large portion of one of the Brehon Law Tracts is taken up with the law relating to dog-fights and injuries to persons attempting to promote or to put an end to them. These preliminary matters disposed of, the author will define a dog. He will find it laid down quite generally that a dog is "a thing of value." But this search for ju dicial definition, for no "modern" textwriter will venture an opinion or definition of his own, will be rewarded much better. The Supreme Court of Indiana,1 without deciding whether or not dogs are " animals," has ruled that they are "brute creatures and domestic fowls." But note, reader, that the court was construing an act of the legisla ture, and hence the ordinary meanings of words did not necessarily apply. This de cision will go far towards explaining a deci sion of the Supreme Court of Michigan 2 to the effect that it is no justification for kill ing a dog that he is found under suspi cious circumstances in a hen-house. Surely that is a very proper place for a domestic fowl, if not for all brute creatures. Our author will also find it laid down that dogs are not persons, and hence that dogs are incapable of being police officers or constables,J though animals of less re puted intelligence than the dog have been known to fill higher positions : presumably because they were persons. Following approved methods of classifi cation, our author will doubtless proceed to consider (1) Rights of Dogs, (2) Duties and 1 State v. Giles, 125 Ind. 154. 2 Bowers v. Horan, 93 Mich. 420. • Heisrodt z>. Ilackett, 3 Cent. Law Journ. 479.

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Liabilities of-Dogs, (3) Duties and Liabil ities of Persons Dealing with Dogs. A few suggestions may be made under each head. A writer has recently given an affirmative answer to the question: "Have animals rights?" and as Austin and others of his close way of thinking, who would scout such a proposition, are growing out of fashion, we may expect our author to maintain through several pages of vigorous rhetoric that dogs have rights, — and therefore that they have legal rights. How these rights are to be enforced, is a serious question which the exigencies of argument may re quire him to leave unanswered. How far masters are to be regarded as the natural guardians of dogs, and whether the rights of canine litigants should be protected by guardians ad litem appointed for the pur pose, we are not prepared to say. The duties and liabilities of dogs are everywhere the subject of legislation. To wear collars, to refrain from running at large, and not to amuse themselves by wor rying sheep, are universal requirements. But the common law has something to say under this head. In considering the com mon law duties of dogs, our, author will do well to follow Dr. Watts, whose classifica tion of the propensities of dogs seems to have been confirmed judicially. In this way the duties of dogs may be classified under two heads, (1) to abstain from bark ing, (2) to abstain from biting. For it has been ruled that the tracking up of freshly painted door-steps by a dog is not action able* In that case the dog in question was wont to exercise his vocal powers about the premises of the complainant, and in addition to defacing the painted steps in vaded the hen-roost, whereupon the owner of the premises brought quo warranto with his revolver and executed an ouster. The court ruled that the action did not lie. But aliter as to the barking where a dog brought with him divers companions, votaries of 4 bowers v, Horan, 93 Mich. 420.