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greeing with this doctrine are Stanley v. State, 24 Ohio St. 166; 15 Am. Rep. 604; State v. Ellis, 11 Vermont, 650; State v. Underwood, 49 Me. 181; Watson v. State, 36 Miss. 593; State v. Johnson, 2 Oreg. 115; States. Bennett, 14 Iowa, 479; Ferrell v. Com., 1 Duvall, 150; Com, v. White, 123 Mass. 430; 25 Am. Rep. 116; Worthington v. State, 58 Md. 403; 42 Am. Rep. 338; Powell v. State, '52 Wis., 217; State v. Newman, 9 Nev. 48; 16 Am. Rep. 3; People v. Williams, 24 Mich. 164. On the other hand, agreeing with the Virginia case are Lee v. State, 66 Ga. 203; 37 Am. Rep. 67; People v. Gardner, 2 Johns. 477; State?-. LeBlanch,2 Vroom, 82; Simmons v. Com., 5 Binney, Pa. 617; State v. Brown, 1 Haywood (N. C), 100; Simpson v. State, 4 Humph (Tenn.), 456; Beall v. State, 15 Ind. 378; State v. Reonnals, 14 La. Am. 298. So here we have arrayed the States — or all of them which we have discovered — twelve adjudging the act lar ceny, and nine that it is not. The theory upon which the Virginia doctrine is maintained is clearly an nounced in the Maryland case above, namely, that although a thief may not be punished in one State for a larceny committed in another, yet if he brings the stolen goods into the former State, he may be punished as for "a new larceny." This is a very shadowy distinction. The only real larceny is in the foreign State. Certainly the thief does not " take and carry away the goods of another " in the second State, for he brings them into that State with him self. We think the Virginia decision is right, and that the doctrine of constructive and fresh larceny is unsound. "K1ndergarten." — In Sinnott v. Colomber, California Supreme Court, 28 L. R. A. 594, it was held that the court would take judicial notice of the meaning of this word, observing : — "We think we may take judicial cognizance of its signif icance, as the supreme court of Colorado has apparently done. Re Kindergarten Schools, 18 Colo. 234, 19 L. K. A. 469. Thus informed, we lind that the term ' kindergarten ' (meaning literally ' a garden of children' ) was devised by Friedrich W. A. Froebel, German philosopher and educa tor, to apply to a system which he elaborated for the in struction of children of very tender years. ' Children's gar den' ought to be taken in its allegorical sense. The child is a plant, the school is a garden, and F'roebel calls teachers § 537, Payne's translation. ' Me saw that the child's in born desire for activity manifests itself in play, and that children love to play together. His system, therefore, guides this inclination into organized movement, and in vests the games (unknown to the child) with an ethical and educational value, teaching, besides physical exercises, the habits of discipline, self-control, harmonious action and purpose, together with some definite lesson of fact.' Sennenschein's Cyclopaedia of Education, p. 169."
 * gardeners of children.' Compayre, History of Pedagogy,

B1cycles In Thompson v. Dodge, Minnesota Supreme Court, 28 L. R. A. 608, it was held that a person driving a horse has no rights in the highway superior to those of one riding a bicycle. The court said : —" In the use of a public highway, there are certain rights of the road which must be observed by all persons, and a violation of those rights constitutes actionable negligence. A bicycle is a vehicle used now very extensively for con venience, recreation, pleasure, and business, and the riding of one upon the public highway in the ordinary manner as is now done is neither unlawful nor prohibited, and they cannot be banished because they were not ancient vehicles, and used in the Garden of Eden by Adam and Eve." So in Pennsylvania recently a wheelman recovered for the destruction of his wheel which he left standing against the curbstone, and which a heavy wagon ran over. "Inflammatory. " — This was the adjective ap plied by Mr. Clair, of Nebraska, an attorney, to a charge made by Judge Scott to a grand jury, on a mo tion to quash an indictment. The Judge considered the dignity of the court infringed and undertook to punish Mr. Scott for contempt of court. The matter went to the Supreme Court, and it was there held (40 Neb. 534) that the adjective was well deserved and that the attorney should go Scott free. The charge was on the subject of bribery, and was a redhot one, and wound up with the following explosion of rhetorical rockets : — "A little well directed effort on your part, as grand jur ors, in the direction here indicated, would doubtless open up a field into which a stone could not be thrown without hitting a criminal. You should see to it that the stone is thrown, and thrown hard. You owe it to yourselves, the people whom you represent in your present service, and to your sworn obligations to make that effort, and to make it with such an uncompromising zeal that hereafter a mark more indelible than that put upon Cain shall be stamped upon their foreheads, marking them as ' ticket of leave men' and moral blisters upon the body politic. There comes up from the people a command for a forward march all along the line of your duty. You should give heed to that cry, for it comes from a patient and long-suffering en durance which has at last reached its limit." The court cited definitions of " inflammatory " from Webster's Dictionary, and concluded that it was " an impassioned appeal, if not indeed express direction, to the grand jury to present, by indictment, certain persons not named, but who are assumed to be guilty of the crime of bribery. In that sense, if not inflam matory, it is at least what, in the science of medi cine, is denominated heroic treatment." Judge Scott meant well, but erred through that which Talleyrand so much deprecated — zeal. We congratulate Mr. Clair on his pluck. He is Young-man-not-afraid-of-the-Judge.