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some familiarity with his written opinions, beginning with the case of Wills v. Greely, 50 Maine, 78, and extending through thirtysix volumes. They are all marked with one quality, clearness and brevity of statement. Not a waste word can be found in one of them. As has been said of Tacitus: "The love of brevity distinguishes him from all other writers. . . . and was, perhaps, carried farther by that constant habit of close think ing which could seize the principal idea and discard all unnecessary appendages." But the criticism made of Tacitus' writings is not true of the Judge,— that "one contin ued strain of studied brevity fatigues the ear and tires the reader by an unvaried and disgusting monotony." The late Judge Libbey, speaking of his terseness, in which he thought he excelled all other judges, said he admired it because he prized lucidity above all other qualities, both in speech and writ ing. In making a selection of his opinions, which are recognized for their learning and ability, as well as extensively cited and fol lowed in other courts, mention of the follow ing cases will suffice the present purpose : Wyman v. Brown, 50 Maine, 139, holding that an estate of free.-hold may commence in future, State v. Wright, 53 Maine, 328, deciding that jurors are not judges of the law as well as of the facts; Smith v. Morrill, 54 Maine, 48, relating to blank indorse ments of promissory notes, and the admis sibility of evidence to explain them; Hatch v. Atkinson, 56 Maine, 324, showing the necessity of delivery in cases of a gift, do natio causa mortis, and a much quoted de cision; Goddard v. Grand Trunk Railway, 57 Maine, 202, asserting and vindicating the doctrine of punitive damages. The simple reading of these few cases, taken at random, will demonstrate how this learned judge has devoted a life to the study of fundamental principles which in the end will irresistibly control in the administration of the law. The intrinsic value of these

cases, now become precedents of authority, is enhanced when it is remembered that a great deal of force is added to them by having a man of force and likelihood behind them. It must not, however, be supposed that the Judge has entirely confined himself to " volumes which you must count by hun dreds, by thousands; filling libraries, exact ing long labors, the labors of a lifetime, abstracted from business, from politics." His practical knowedge of business is of daily use and leads inevitably to sound con clusions, without reliance upon legal pre cedents alone, as in the case of the Franklin Co. v. Lewiston Institution for Savings, 68 Maine, 43, in which he lays down the safe and conservative rule that savings banks cannot purchase stock in another corpora tion on credit by giving its note therefor. For the benefit of the current reader, the following extract from the case of Townshend v. Howard, 86 Maine, 288, is pro duced to exhibit the terseness of his opin ions, already alluded to: — "Walton, J. The question is whether a will made by the late George H. Townshend was afterwards legally revoked. We think it was. A will can be revoked in whole or in part, by cancellation or obliter ation. R. S., c. 74, § 3. To cancel is to cross out. To obliterate is to blot out. The former leaves the words legible. The latter leaves the words illegible. By either method a will can be revoked in whole or in part. If that which is essential to the validity of the whole will is cancelled or obliterated, animo revocandi, the whole will is revoked. If only a single clause is so cancelled or obliterated, then that clause only is revoked. And such cancellations or obliterations are as effectual when made with a pencil as when made with a pen." His pithy remark in Greenleaf v. Grounder, 84 Maine, 51, needs no explanation. "And the fact that the witness was not called at the former trial, and that, so far as ap pears, no search was made for him, or