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the legislature might impose, while the legislation has been deemed void with respect to natural persons. Some re cent decisions on this subject are the following : Leep v. St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. 58 Ark. 407, 23 L. R. A. 264; State v. Peel Splint Coal Co. 36 W. Va. 802, 17 L. R. A. 385; Hancock v. Vaden, 121 Ind. 366, 6 L. R. A. 576; State v. Brown & S. Mfg. Co. 18 R. I. —, 17 L. R. A. 856; Shaffer v. Union Min. Co. of Alleghany County, 55 Md. 74; Tilt v. People ( Ill.; Feb. 1795) 40 N. E. Rep. 462." The judges cite their recent holding that a law for bidding the employment of women, although adult, more than ten hours a day, is valid; and this too we believe stands alone, at least in relation to individ ual employers. (Com. v. Hamilton Man. Co. 120 Mass. 383.) The way in which the court gets around the argument that a woman has a right to work as many hours as she chooses seems to us a quibble. The Court concede that she has, but say that the law in question merely forbids her employ ment by any single employer for more than ten hours! The advantages of a police and health bill which for bids a woman to work more than ten hours a day for a particular employer, but allows her to work, say, six hours more for another employer on the same day, are not obvious. We regard the opinion as unsound. Adult and sane people have a natural right to contract without leave of any constitutional per mission. If A is willing to work for monthly pay ments he certainly ought to be allowed to do so, and if he is not willing he can stop. The argument that the law is valid because it is wholesome is not very convincing, for a law compelling men to go to church and to vote would be wholesome, but it would not be valid. We do not see that the peculiar language of the Constitution gives the legislature any wider pow er of law-making than under ordinary constitutions, but it certainly is an implied power, under any con stitution, that the legislature may make wholesome and reasonable laws for the good and welfare of the commonwealth. But we do not think it " reason able " to enact that a housewife shall pay her cook, or a farmer his haying-hand every week. It is not necessary, for the employee has a simple remedy — he can quit. It is not reasonable, for it makes a uni form rule that may not be convenient for many, and is inquisitorial when applied to all. The Court say : "We know of no reason derived from the Constitu tion of the commonwealth or of the United States why there should be a distinction made in respect to such legislation between corporations and persons engaged in manufacturing, when both do the same kind of business." The Constitution may not point out any distinction, but there is one in the nature of things. The legislature has an arbitrary right to regulate the conduct of corporations, which are its creatures, and exist only by its will, unless it has failed

to reserve such right, but it has no such corresponding right in respect to individuals. We find an incon sistency between the reasoning of this opinion and that in Com. v. Perry, 155 Mass. 117; 14 L. R. A. 325, which disapproved a law forbidding an employ er to deduct wages of weavers for bad work. In that case the prohibition in the Federal Constitution of laws impairing the obligation of contracts was recog nized, but in the opinion in question it seems to be ignored because there is no similar provision in the Massachusetts Constitution. In the Perry case the court characterized the right assailed by the statute as " an interference with the right to make reason able and proper contracts in conducting a legitimate business," and derived that right from the constitu tional guaranty of the right of" acquiring, possess ing and protecting property." It might well be that a manufacturer could not pay his employees weekly, and the requirement that he should would break up his business and prevent him from acquiring property.

Reasons for Discharge of Employee.— In Geor gia, in 189 1, a statute was passed requiring incorpor ated railroad, telegraph and express companies to give to discharged employees or agents the reasons for their discharge when removed, under penalty of $5,000 for refusal to comply, to be recovered by the party aggrieved. This law has been declared invalid in Wallace v. Georgia etc. Ry. Co. 22 Southeast ern Rep. 579. The Court wrote no opinion, but in its official syllabus observed : "Liberty of speech and of writing is secured by the Con stitution, and incident thereto is the correlative liberty of silence, not less important nor less sacred. Statements or communications, oral or written, wanted for private infor mation, cannot be coerced by mere legislative mandate at the will of one of the parties and against the will of the other. Compulsory private discovery, even from corpora tions, enforced, not by suit or action, but by statutory ter ror, is not allowable where rights are under the guardian ship of due process of law." The New York Law Journal points out that this is analogous to the decision of the Missouri Supreme Court, in State v. Julow, 31 South eastern Rep. 781, holding void a statute which assumed to prohibit employers from dismissing ser vants on account of their membership in labor un ions. Under the Massachusetts opinion above cited, we do not see why both these statutes would not have been upheld as for the "good and welfare" of the State. Constitutional provisions for " general wel fare " are very elastic and have always been fruitful of discussion.