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 Rh School Teachers Us1ng Tobacco. — An out cry was raised by some of the newspapers in the State of New York, against a proposed bill to pro hibit the employment of public school teachers who use tobacco. This might seem at first thought to be a singular and unwarrantable intermeddling with the personal habits of teachers, but there is a peculiar ground on which it can be justified in that State. There is a law on the statute-book that when phy siology is taught in the public schools, the effect of narcotics and intoxicants on the human body shall be explained, in the text-books employed and by oral inculcation. In view of that law the present measure would seem not out of keeping. It would be rather absurd for a pedagogue, while telling the children to beware of tobacco, to take a chew or squirt his tobacco-laden saliva into a neighboring cuspidor, or light up his pipe or cigar at recess or on leaving the school-house at the close of the day. Example in a teacher's person is fully as strong as inculcation, and when it is inconsistent with it, the latter must suffer. NOTES OF CASES. Carr1er — Arrest of Passenger by Servant. — In Central R. Co. v. Brewer (Maryland Court of Appeals), 27 L. R. A. 63, it was held that the su perintendent of a street-railway company has no im plied authority to cause the arrest of a passenger for placing in the fare-box a counterfeit coin in payment of fare, so as to make the company liable for false imprisonment in case of such arrest without proof of precedent authority or subsequent ratification of his act. This was grounded on Carter v. Howe Machine Co. 51 Md. 290; 34 Am. Rep. 311. The Court cited : Roe v. Birkenhead etc. R. Co. 7 Exch. 36; Eastern Co. R. Co. v. Broom, 6 Exch. 314; Mali v. Lord, 39 N. Y. 381; 100 Am. Dec. 448 v. Mobile & G. R.Co. 15 Fed. Rep. 199; Bank of New South Wales v. Owston, 48 L. J. P. C. 25; Danby v. Beardsley, 43 L. T. N. S. 603; Edwards v. Lon don & N. W. R. Co. L. R. 5 C. P. 445; Allen v. London & S. W. R. Co. L. R. 6 Q. B. 65; Brokaw 71. New Jersey R. & Transp. Co. 32 N. J. L. 328. 90. Am. Dec. 659; Vanderbilt v. Richmond Turnp. Co. 2 N. Y. 479; 51 Am. Dec. 315. To these may be added : Mulligan v. N. Y. etc. R. Co. 129 N. Y. 506; 25 Am. St. Rep. 539; 13 L. R. A. 791, (two judges dissenting); Charleston v. London etc. Co. Q. B. Div. Somewhat to the contrary, Palmieri v. Manhattan R. Co. 133 N. Y. 261; 28 Am. St. Rep. 362; 16 L. R. A. 136; Staples 7'. Schmid, 18 R. I. Co. 35 W. Va. 588; 29 Am. St. Rep. 827 514 L. R. A. 798; not on account of difference in principle,
 * 19 L. R. A. 824; Gillingham v. Ohio R. R.

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but in circumstances showing authority or ratifica tion. In Gabrielson v. Waydell, 135 N. Y. 1, 31 Am. St. Rep. 793, 17 L. R. A. 228, it was held (three judges dissenting) that an assault by a cap tain on a seaman, for refusing to work on account of illness, does not render the owner of the vessel liable. Robb1ng 1n' Good Fa1th. — There is one prin ciple of criminal law that has always seemed to us rather dangerous, and that is that where one has money or other chattels which another in good faith believes to be his, the latter may take them away secretly or openly and forcibly, without being deemed guilty of robbery or larceny. Thus taking under a claim of right, however unfounded, it is said is not larceny if the claim is made in good faith, and just now, in Utah (People v. Hughes, Utah, 39 Pac. Rep. 492), it was held that where a man, under a bona fide belief that money is his own, obtains it by threats, there is a trespass, but no robbery; and that it is competent for a defendant to testify that at the time of an alleged robbery he thought the money taken was his own, and that he had the right to take it. This was where the accused, a gambler, while intoxicated, had lost a large sum of money, unfairly, as he thought, and proceeded to reimburse himself, with the aid of a revolver, from the table and person of the saloon-keeper. The Court said : — "The rule governing this class of cases seems to be well settled and thoroughly defined. In a note in 70 Am. Dec. 188 (State v. McCune), where a number of authorities are collected, this proposition is laid down; 'When the prisoner takes the property under a bona fide impression that the property belongs to him, he commits no robbery, for there is no animus fnrandi (Long v. State, 12 Ga. 293; Brown v. State, 28 Ark. 126, where the taking was in the presence of others, as was the case at bar.) Again, it is held that when a creditor compels the payment of his debt by the use of violence, he is not guilty of robbery, for there is no animus furamii (State-'. Hollyway, 41 Iowa, 200). In the Iowa case, Miller, C. J., says : 'In robbery, as in larceny, it is essential that the taking of the goods be animo furandi. Unless the taking be with a felonious intent, it is not robbery. If a man, under a bona fide belief that the property is his own, obtain it by menaces, there is a trespass, but no robbery. Though the defendant take the goods with violence, or by putting in fear, yet, if he do so under a bona fide claim, it is no robbery, for the reason that the felonious intent is wanting.' 'In all cases of this kind, the question whether, the act is done with a felonious intent is one of fact for the jury.'" This seems like making a man a judge in his own case. What especially puzzles us is the idea that such a taking, although not robbery or larceny, is still a trespass. If defensible at all, it is only on the