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with presuming on the inadvertence or obtuseness of the court. After getting the poor fellow all worked up Socrates asks him whether he believes that there are human affairs without human beings; or pipers without pipes; or things pertaining to horses without horses. Miletus is si lent. "But answer to this at least, my good man, is there anyone who believes that there are things relating to demons, but does not believe that there are demons?" The court here compels Miletus to an swer, and he says that naturally there are not. Socrates then picks up a copy of the indictment and reads: "Socrates does not believe in those Gods in whom the city be lieves, but in other strange gods," and then adds in a tone that must have cut to the core : — "Therefore, Miletus, according to your own indictment I do believe in demons (to daificmm) or in things relating thereto. If then I believe in things relating to de mons, there is surely an absolute necessity that I should believe that there are demons. » Is rt not so? It is. (For I suppose you assent since you do not answer.) But with respect to demons, do we not allow that they

are the children of gods? You admit this, do you not?" Miletus says that he certainly does. "That'll do, Miletus," says Socrates; "step down. You must have preferred this indict ment for want of some real charge to bring against me. For how could any man of sense suppose me to believe that there are children of gods and not believe in the gods themselves? It would be just as absurd for one to believe that mules are the offspring of horses and asses and then deny that there are such things as horses and asses." Later on he asks Miletus why, if he cor rupted the youth, their relations didn't testify against him, and that is probably the only really serious question he put to Miletus in his whole defense. The cross-examination is the very essence of irony and contempt. And how skillfully he suppresses and still discloses his contempt — ever remembering that some of the jury are probably no better than the witness and therefore sure to resent his abuse. Without intimidation he pre vents the witness from defending himself, and without bullying he gets him to make the most conflicting statements and admis sions. Surely Socrates as a cross-examiner is worthy of imitation.