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 Rh ties to pass, and that the collision might have been avoided if plaintiff had exercised due care, he could not recover, though defendant did not turn to the right. The court observed : "To warrant a recovery where both parties are present at the time of the injury, as well as in other cases, ability on the part of the defendant must concur with nonability on the part of the plaintiff to prevent it by ordinary care. Their duty to exercise this degree of care is equal and reciprocal. Neither is exonerated from this obligation by the present or previous misconduct of the other. The law no more holds one responsible for an unavoidable, or justifies an avoidable, injury to the person of one who care lessly exposes himself to danger, than to his property, similarly situated, in his absence, l1e who cannot prevent an injury negligently inflicted upon his person or property by an intelligent agent ' present and acting at the time ' (State v. Manchester L. & R. Co. 52 N. II. 528, 557: White v. Winnisimmet Co., 7 Cush. 155, 157; Robinson v. Cone, 22 Vt. 213), is legally without fault, and it is im material whether his inability results from his absence, previous negligence, or other cause. On the other hand, his neglect to prevent it, if he can, is the sole or co-opera ting cause of the injury. No one can justly complain of another's negligence, which, but for his own w rongful in terposition, would 1)4 harmless (Parker v. Adams, 12 Mete. [Mass.], 415; Nashua Iron & Steel Co. v. Worcester & N. K. Co. 62 N. H. 159, 163). "No negligence on the part of the defendant is shown, other than the legal negligence of not seasonably turning to the right of the centre of the highway. Whether the defendant's legal negligence, in violating the law of the ruad, rendered him liable to the plaintiff in damages, de pends upon the determination of the question whether the injury could or could not have been avoided by t.he exer cise of ordinary care by the plaintiff, whether it was or was not the legal cause of the injury. The fact that the de fendant was violating the law of the road does not, as matter of law, warrant a recovery by the plaintiff (Damon v. Scituate, 119 Mass. 66, 68). If the parties were re versed, and the defendant was seeking damages from the plaintiff, the defendant's legal negligence, in disregarding the statute, would not necessarily, and as matter of law, defeat a recovery (Steele v. Burkhardt, 104 Mass. 59; Spofford v. Harlow, 3 Allen, 176). The question would still be, whose fault caused the collision? (State v. Man chester & L. R. Co. 52 N. H. 528, 557). The fact that a party was acting in violation of law when an injury was done to his person or property by the wrongful act of another does not deprive him of his action for damages, unless the injury resulted from the unlawful act (Wood man v. Hubbard, 25 N. H. 67; Norris v. Litchfield, 35 N. H. 271, 277; Nutt v. Manchester, 58 N. II. 226; Sewell v. Webster, 59 N. H. 586: Wentworth v. Jeffer son, 60 E.H. 158; Lyons v. Child, 61 N. H. 72 : Welch v. Wesson, 6 Gray, 505)." In England the law of the road is to turn to the left. Pictures of English milking scenes represent the milker on the left side of the cow. We formerly supposed this was the engraver's mistake, but it is

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the English custom. The "Troy Times" had a picture of Gov. Morton in the act of taking the oath of office, with his left hand up. Would that oath be legal? Extort1on — Ev1dence. — In People v. Gard ner, a recent decision of New York Court of Appeals, two interesting points were passed upon. The first was that an attempt at extortion may be committed when the defendant supposed he was committing it, although in fact he was being decoyed. A woman, who kept a house of prostitution, testified that the defendant approached her and promised that if she would pay him money he would refrain from accus ing her of that offence, and that in consenting she was acting merely as a decoy for the police. The statute provides that extortion may be committed by obtaining property from another by force or " fear," and that an "attempt" is "an act done with intent to commit a crime, and trusting, but failing to effect its commission." The defendant's counsel argued that " the fact that his threat did not inspire fear in ducing any action on the part of Mrs. Amos, an element essential to constitute the completed crime of extortion, renders it impossible to sustain an in dictment and conviction for the lesser crime of an attempt at extortion." This view was taken by a majority of the judges of the General Term, but their decision is reversed by the Court of Appeals, Judge Earl delivering the unanimous opinion, holding that an attempt is not deprived of its criminal character by the fact that in the nature of things unknown to the defendant it could not succeed, likening the case to an attempt to pick an empty pocket. Judge Earl said : "It is now established law, both in England and in this country, that the crime of attempting to commit larceny may be committed, although there was no property to steal, and thus the full crime of larceny could not have been committed" (see People v. Moran, 123 N. Y. 254). . . . "In Reg. v. Goodchild (2 Carr. &; Kir. 293), and Keg. v. Goodall (2 Cox, Cr. C. 41) it was held under a statute making it a felony to administer poison or use any instrument with intent to procure the miscarriage of any woman that the crime could be committed in a case where the woman was not pregnant. It has been held in several cases that there may be a conviction of an attempt to ob tain property by false pretenses, although the person from whom the attempt was made knew at the time that the pretenses were false, and could not, therefore, be deceived." It was also held that no error was committed by the trial judge in forcibly compelling the prisoner to stand up in court, so that he could be identified by a witness. This was put on two grounds : first, that the court could control the conduct of the prisoner in court as to sitting or standing, etc.; and second,