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usually prolific cause of "cruelty.' furnished only 567. The causes were as follows : — Granted Granted to Wife. to Husband. Adultery 196 189 400 Absence and neglect . 980 51 Cruelty 516 Drunkenness 276 47 IO Fraud 12 Miscellaneous 26 50 Total . 2,023 730 It looks very much as if this country would equal its former record of 322,000 in twenty years.

NOTES OF CASES. W1fe Harbor1ng a Dog. — In Strouse v. Leipf, Alabama Supreme Court, 23 Lawyers' Rep. Anno tated, 623, it was held that a wife is not liable for harboring a vicious dog on her own premises, al though by law she holds her estate separate, and her husband is not liable for her torts in which he does not participate. This is an elaborate examination by Stone, J., at the conclusion of which he observes : — "Let us recur to the facts of this case. The dog had been on the premises for several years. No present act of negligence is charged against husband or wife which led to the escape of the dog and the consequent injury of the plaintiff. The fault charged was and is that a dog with known vicious propensity was kept on the premises, and that, escaping therefrom, he inflicted the injury complained of. The wrongful act was the keep of the dog. This pertained to the government of the household and premises, — the economy and administration of the domes tic affairs. It was not the act of a moment, or the work of an hour or a day. It was continuous in its nature, and must be charged to the account of the head — the govern ing head — of the family. For this injury no suit could have been maintained at common law against the husband and wife jointly. It would have been adjudged to be his act, his wife, at most, acting conjointly with him, and under his presumed control. Nor has the statute wrought any change in this bearing of the question. If the wife had any part or lot in the keep of the dog, it cannot be classed as her tort, ' in the commission of which he did not participate' She could not keep the dog without his con sent and participation. Hence the case is not brought within the provisions of the statute. "A further argument : Let us suppose the husband had been sued, and he had pleaded in bar that the wife owned and kept the dog. Every one will say such defense would be frivolous. The husband, the head and governor of the family, must be held accountable for the economy and administration of the household. This power and right have not been taken away or impaired by the statutes securing to married women their separate estates. We are aware that we have given to this subject a somewhat extended consideration. We have done so because it

brings before us, for the first time, the inquiry to what extent, if any, our married women's laws have changed the relations of the husband to the household and its govern ment. We have felt that so grave a question should not be slurred over, but should be, clearly and definitely settled; and, notwithstanding our statutes have revolutionized the property rights of the wife, they have effected no change in the headship — the dominion and control — of the husband over the household^ or in the government of the home and its appurtenants." The contrary of this has been held in Shaw v. McCreery, 19 Ont. 39; 42 Ab. L. J. 241; Quilty v. Hatty, 135 New York, 201. In a recent Colorado case, husband and wife were held properly joined in such an action, it not appearing to whom the dog belonged; and in McLaughlin v. Kemp, 152 Mass. 7, it was held a question of fact whether the wife harbored the dog with knowledge of its vicious pro pensities. Sunday Barber1sm. — The Michigan Supreme Court, in People v. Bellet, 57 N.W. Reporter, 1094, held that a statute forbidding barbers to exercise their calling on Sunday is valid, not depriving the citizen of property without due process, nor abridging his privileges or immunities, nor being class legisla tion. The Court said on this last point : — "By class legislation we understand such legislation as denies rights to one which are accorded to others, or inflicts upon one individual a more severe penalty than is imposed upon another, in like case, offending. In Liberman v. State (26 Neb. 464), an ordinance of the city prohibited the keeping open of any business house, bank, store, saloon or office, excepting telegraph offices, express offices, photograph galleries, railroad offices, telephone offices, hotels, restaurants, cigar stores, eating houses, ice cream parlors, drug stores, etc. It was contended that the ordinance was open to the objection that it did not operate upon all citizens alike; that the respondent was compelled to close his place of business on Sunday, while drug stores, tobacco houses and others in competition in business were not required to do so. But the Court held the act valid. In the present case it may have been the judgment of the Legislature that those engaged in the particular calling were more likely to offend against the law of the State providing for Sunday closing than those engaged in other callings. If so, it became a question of policy as to whether a more severe penalty should not be provided for engaging in that particular business on Sunday than that inflicted upon others who refuse to cease from their labors one day in seven." The Law of the Road. — The statute law of New Hampshire requires persons driving on highways and meeting others to turn to the right of the center of the travelled part. But in Brember v. Jones, the ,supreme court of that State recently decided that where it appeared that there was sufficient room for both par