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 Rh has been pending three years, reversed their former decision, and now hold that the murder of an intes tate by one of his natural heirs does not estop the murderer from taking the inheritance. The former decision was based on the celebrated case of Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N.Y. 506. Since the decision of the latter case however, an Ohio circuit court have held to the contrary of the New York case, in Dean v. Milliken, 28 Ohio Law Journ. 357; and in Owens v. Owens, 100 N. C. 240, a widow, acces sary to the murder of her husband, was still held entitled to dower. The last two cases were cited by the court in the principal case, but no reference was made to the celebrated case of Cleaver v. Mutual Reserve Fund Life Association, 1 Q. B. [1892], 147. There it was held that the executors of Mr. Maybrick could recover an insurance on his life effected by him for the benefit of his wife, although she had mur dered him; but it was put on the ground that the moneys formed part of his estate, the trust for her benefit having become void by reason of her crime, and as between the insurer and the executors the question of public policy could not arise. Esher, M. R., said: "That the person who commits murder, or any person claiming under him or her, should be allowed to benefit by his or her criminal act, would no doubt be contrary to public policy. But if the matter can be dealt with so that such person should not be benefited," the company should not be allowed to avoid the policy for ' which they had received premiums for many years. Fry, L. J., said: "It appears to me that no system of jurisprudence can with reason include amongst the rights which it enforces rights resulting directly to the person assert ing them from the crime of that person. If no action can arise from fraud, it seems impossible to suppose that it can arise from felony or misdemeanor." Lopes, S. J., said: " I do not doubt that the prin ciple of public policy would prevent the wife from recovering the amount of the policy money from them, and so reaping benefit from her crime." These observations are of course obiter, but they express the common and right sense of the matter. The Nebraska court now repudiate the New York doc trine, because they have discovered that the latter court misapprehended the case of Insurance Com pany v. Armstrong, 117 U. S. 599, in assuming that the action was brought by the representative of the murderer instead of the representative of the insured. That does not help the Nebraska court. If the right of action was denied to the representative of the innocent insured, much more would it be denied to the representative of the murderer. (The Arm strong case is contrary to the Maybrick case, but that is unimportant; our court simply go further than the English court on the same road.) It

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really seems to us that the question is too clear for debate. The position of the Nebraska, Ohio and North Carolina courts, that a murderer may inherit from his victim, because the statute of descent does not say that he shall not, seems almost grotesque in its blind narrowness amounting to practical immor ality. One might as well contend that a highway man who kills a traveler and takes his horse, al though he must go to prison for the crime, is still entitled to the horse because the statute does not provide to the contrary! The Saviour probably did not think that the wicked men in the parable were sound in law when they said: "This is the heir; come, let us kill him, and the inheritance shall be ours." And the "Central Law Journal" is equally grotesque when it pronounces this Nebraska decision to be on "a safe and sound basis."

Administration on Estate of Living Person. — Another decision almost equally grotesque, in our judgment, was that of the New York Court of Ap peals, in Roderigas v. Institution, 63 New York, 460; 20 Am. Rep. 555, that letters of administra tion on the estate of a person still living would pro tect his debtor in paying the debt to that adminis trator. This judgment was pronounced by four judges against three, and has always stood alone, and has recently been disapproved by the United States Supreme Court, in Scott v. McNeal. It was denied in Davlin v. Commonwealth, 101 Pa. St. 273; 47 Am Rep. 710, and disapproved in Johnson v. Beazley, 65 Mo. 2505-27 Am. Rep. 285; and the con trary was declared in Melia v. Simmons, 45 Wis. 384; 30 Am. Rep. 746; Thomas v. People, 107 la. 517; 47 Am. Rep. 458; Stevenson v. Superior Court, 62 Cal. 60; D'Arusment v. Jones, 4 Lea, 251; 40 Am. Rep. 12, Gray, J., in the principal case, also cites to the same effect; French v. Fraziers Adm'r (1832), 7 J. J. Marsh, 425, 427; State v. White (1846), 7 Ired. 116; Duncan v. Stewart (1854), 25 Ala., 408; 60 Am.. Dec. 527; Andrews v. Avory (1858), 14 Grat. 229, 236; 73 Am. Dec. 355; Moore v. Smith (1858), 11 Rich. Law, 569; 73 Am. Dec. 122; Morgan v. Dodge (1862), 44 N. H. 255, 259; 82 Am. Dec. 213; Withers v. Patterson (1864), 27 Tex. 491, 497; 86 Am. Dec. 643; Mo., 250, 264; Perry v. Railroad (1882), 29 Kan. 420, 423. The learned justice observes: — "All proceedings of such courts in the probate of wills and the granting of administrations depend upon the fact that a person is dead, and are null and void if he is alive. Their jurisdiction in this respect being limited to the estates of deceased persons, they have no jurisdiction whatever to administer and dispose of the estates of living