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What's in a Name? — The attention of this Chair was recently called in a practical way to the case of Hanson v. Globe Newspaper Co.. 159 Massachusetts, 293, which decides a perfectly novel question. It was an action for libel in a newspaper article attribut ing riotous conduct in court to " H. P. Hanson, a real estate and insurance broker of South boston." The details of the occurrence were correct, and H. P. H. was a real estate and insurance broker of South Boston, but the person really in question was A. P. H. Hanson, who also was a real estate and insurance broker of South Boston, and for whose name that of H. P. Hanson was substituted by mis take. The case was tried without a jury, the judge found that the libel was not "of and concerning" the plaintiff, and judgment went for the defendant. This was affirmed on appeal, three judges dissenting. A case somewhat similar to this was tried in Buffalo recently. A newspaper reporter, reporting certain proceedings in an action for divorce of "Louise Weber v. Clem Weber," founded on the ground that the defendant had another wife living, made the mistake of publishing that the defendant " formerly kept the Silver Dollar Saloon in Buffalo." The reporter was led into this mistake by information from the court officials who heard the proceedings in court. The name of the saloonist was Clement J. Weber and his wife's name was Louisa, but he was generally known as "Clem Weber," and his saloon signs were thus inscribed. He had, however, not lived in Buffalo for ten years, and was a well known and very reputable merchant at Medina. It appeared plainly on the face of the article that he was not the man really referred to, for every other detail was inconsistent with that supposition. Malice was clearly disproved. The newspaper published a prompt, ample, and candid retraction and explana tion, without any request from the plaintiff. It was shown by all the evidence that very few thought the plaintiff was even referred to, and that nobody be lieved the charge. The plaintiff alleged and swore in his complaint to special damage in loss of business and credit, but made no attempt to prove any, and the evidence even of his own witnesses showed indis putably that he sustained no damage whatever. The case was left to the jury, and they found a verdict of $800! The case is stronger for the defense than the

Massachusetts case, for in the latter there was noth ing in the publication to indicate that H. P. H. was not the man intended, while in the other even' allegation, except the mistaken one of description as the saloonist, pointed to a man living in Ohio, and who suddenly disappeared from Buffalo. It seems that there is something in a name. We recently read of a poor fellow in England, who wearied of well doing because nobody would employ him for the reason that his name was " William Sikes," and he was therefore driven to drink and crime and became completely discouraged. But there is certainly such a thing as a respectable name that sheds libel and slander. The Glasgow, Ky., "Times "is responsible for this: •• Benjamin Franklin was lately whipped for stealing chickens; Thomas Jefferson sent up for vagrancy; James Madison fined for getting drunk; Aaron Burr had his eye gouged out in a fight; Zachary Taylor robbed a widow of her spoons; John Wesley was caught breaking into a store; George Washington is on trial for attempted outrage; Andrew Jackson was shot, in a negro bar room; Martin Luther hung himself on the garden palings while stealing a basket of vegetables, and Napoleon Bonaparte is breaking rock for a $3 fine in New Orleans. What's the matter with the old boys?" Repugnant Devises. — A rather novel point is decided, in Day v. Wallace, 144 Illinois, 256; 36 Am. St. Rep. 424, namely, that where the same land is devised in two different clauses of the same will to two different persons, they shall take as co-ten ants. It was held by Coke that the latter alone should take, but Lord Brougham, in Sherrat v. Bentley, 2 M. & K. 149, held as in the principal case. This is also supported by Redfield on Wills, vol. 1, p. 443, and by McGuire 7/. Evans, 5 Ind. Eq. 269. But opposed to this are Holling v. Coonan, 9 Gill, 62, and Coverb v. Seburn, 73 Iowa, 564. The Court in the principal case say, that granting a mistake, "It is impossible to tell in which clause that mistake occurred. We know of no rule by which we are al lowed to say it was made in the first rather than in the last. We can conceive of no good reason why the consequences of such a mistake should be wholly visited upon appellants."