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 Rh of the root of the word, animals should make themselves our guests in our hemes, whether by or against our will and interest;' for instance, rats, mice and flies." The Maine Supreme Court would fall in with this, having decided th#t the dog is not a domestic animal. State <'. Harriman, 75 Me. 562; 46 Am. Rep. 423. And the Queen's Bench of England once held the same of parrots, and the same has been held in England of a performing bear. But the contrary has there been held of a linnet used as a decoy, and a Manchester police magistrate once held it cruelty to domestic animals to feed tame rats to an Indian ferret.

Accord and Satisfaction. — Leeson v. An derson, Michigan Supreme Court, 58 N.W. Rep. 92, decides that the acceptance, by the holder of a pro missory note past due, of a less sum than the face of the note, with an agreement to discharge the debt, does not operate fully to release the debtor. This is cer tainly supported by all the authorities, the reason being the absence of consideration for the agreement. The ••New York Law Journal" intimates that this may not always continue to be the law — a safe prediction to make of any legal principle — and it seems a rather unreasonable doctrine when it is conceded that if there had been a writing with a sticky bit of paper opposite the signature, the creditor would have been bound. Such virtue is in wafers! As to the lack of consideration, it is admitted that one creditor may bind himself to take less provided another also binds himself, the promise of the one being a con sideration for the promise of the other : but why is the detriment to the creditor any more a considera tion than the benefit to the debtor?

Nuisance — Fireworks — Liability of City for Injury by. — In Spear v. City of Brooklyn, New York Court of Appeals, Oct. 3, 1893, it was decided that a large display of fireworks, including heavily charged explosives, held at the junction of two narrow and completely built streets of a large city, and managed by private persons under no official responsibility, is an unreasonable and danger ous use of the streets, and a public nuisance; and when the exhibition was licensed by the mayor under a permissive ordinance of the common council, the city is liable for injury done thereby. The Court

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Brooklyn did any thing which, as to this plaintiff, placed it in the attitude of a principal, in carrying on the display. The mayor of the city, its chief executive officer, expressly authorized it, assuming to act, in so doing, under an or dinance of the common council. In so doing, and in con struing the ordinance as authorizing him to grant a permit to private persons to use the public streets for the discharge of fireworks, he was following the practice which had long prevailed; and, so far as appears, no question had been raised that such permits were within the ordinance. The permit, when given and communicated to the police, was understood as preventing any police interference with the act permitted, and it had that effect in the case in ques tion. The city had power to prohibit or regulate the use of fireworks within the city, and to enact ordinances upon the subject. The ordinances were not ultra vires, in the sense that it was not within the power or authority of the corporation to act in reference to the subject under any circumstances. See Dill. Mun. Corp., Sec. 963 et stq. It is the settled doctrine of the courts that a municipality is not bound merely by the assent of its executive officers to wrongful acts of third persons, nor could the mayor bind the city by a permit, for the granting of which he had no color of authority from the common council, and which was not within the general scope of his authority. Thayer vCity of Boston, 19 Pick. 511. If the permit was in fact authorized by the ordinance, the city would, as we con ceive, he liable, although the particular act authorized was wrongful. For a mistake in the exercise of its powers, or by acting in excess of its powers, upon a subject within its jurisdiction, whereby third persons sustain an injury, there seems to be no reason, in justice, which should deny the injured party reparation. The common council is the governing body. It represents the corporation, and its acts are the acts of the corporation, when they relate to subjects over which the corporation has jurisdiction. It is true that the power to pass ordinances and to regulate the use of fireworks did not embrace a power to authorize or legalize nuisances. But, if the ordinance transcended the power of the common council in this respect, the mis construction of the common council of the extent of its powers in dealing with the subject, which was concededly within its power of regulation, does not, we think, within any just view of municipal exemption fion the con sequences of unauthorized and wrongful actsiJ the govern ing body, exempt the city from liability. See Cohen v. Mayor, 113 N.Y. 532." This seems distinguishable from Ball i/. Town of Woodbine, 61 Iowa, 83; 47 Am. Rep. 805; Tindley v. City of Salem, 137 Mass. 171; 50 Am. Rep. 289. In Hill v. Board, etc. 72 N.C. 55; 21 Am. Rep. 451, the cm was held not liable for injuries by fire works, although it had suspended an ordinance for bidding the display of them.

said : — "That a municipal corporation may commit an action able wrong, and become liable for a tort, is now beyond dispute. If the city directed or authorized the discharge of the lireworks which resulted in the injury complained of, it is, we think, liable. The inquiry is whether the city of

Trinkets and Laces. — An interesting case for women is Ocean Steamship Co. v. Way, Georgia Supreme Court, Feb., 1893. 20 Lawy. Rep. Ann. 123, where it was held that under the customs laws.