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After the act creating the Supreme Court, the most important legislation in regard to it was the Act of November, 1824. Until that time, both Supreme and county courts were nisi prius courts, jury trials were had in both. The county court met twice an nually, the Supreme Court once, except the few years when there was what was called the summer and winter terms of the Supreme Court. All the main questions of law generally arose upon a jury trial, no arguments of counsel upon the question nor consideration by the court, except during the trial, when no great delay could be had for the purpose of examining authorities or considering the questions. The Act of 1824 gave the county court original jurisdiction of all criminal matters and all civil actions whatever, except in cer tain cases of judicial writs, etc. The Su preme Court was made exclusively a court of law, and all legal questions arising in the county court could pass to the Supreme Court on exceptions taken to the rulings of the county court, and such questions were then heard and determined in the Supreme Court. Since that date no trials involving questions of fact, in common law cases, have been had in the Supreme Court. The Act of 1824 provided that when in a hearing in the Supreme Court the judges were equally divided in opinion, judgment should be rendered according to the opinion of those who had been present at the jury trial, and in all other cases upon an equal division of opinion judgment should be ren dered according to the opinion of the Chief Judge. The Supreme Court was still con tinued as a court of equity, and also had jurisdiction of such petitions not triable by jury, as might then be brought before the court, and were given jurisdiction of writs of error, habeas corpus, mandamus, scire facias and certiorari. No appeal from the judgment of the county court to the Supreme Court was allowed, but all questions of law passed to

the latter court by way of exception to the ruling of the county court. Two judges of the Supreme Court were required to be present at all trials for capital offenses in the county court and if the judges present at such trial were equally divided in opinion, the decision was rendered in accordance with the opinion of the senior Supreme Court judge. Samuel Prentiss was the fourth of that name in direct descent from Captain Thomas Prentiss, the noted cavalry officer in King Philip's War. His father, when Samuel was a year old, removed from Con necticut to Worcester, Mass., and in about three years to Northfield in the same State, where Samuel passed his boyhood. After his training in the common schools, he studied the classics with a Mr. Allen, and when nineteen years of age entered the office of Samuel Vose as a law student, complet ing his studies with Mr. Blake in Brattleboro, Vt. He was admitted to the Bar a short time before his majority; he was a great student, not only of the law but of the best masters of English literature. A year after his ad mission, he opened an office in Montpelier, which was ever after his home. He soon took high rank in his profession, and as early as 1822 was elected judge of the Supreme Court, which position he declined on account of the inadequacy of the salary and the demands of a large and increasing family. He was a great lawyer, an admirable advocate, and became a great judge. He originated the act which made so important a change in the Supreme Court. Until 1825, the three judges of the county court were mainly farmers, mechanics and mer chants, occasionally a lawyer, but rarely one "learned in the law." Such courts endeav ored to secure justice for all parties, but it is obvious they were liable to errors through lack of a thorough knowledge of the law. The system was so changed that the Chief