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550

and left; but in at least 80 instances out of IOO he would half cross it Chabot's evi dence in suppo.4 of this conclusion may be presented in tabular form. Number of times the "/" in t)i, word "to" is

A. Fifty of Nutlall's letters. . Twenty-eight of Else's letters Nuttall's will

14 28

о S8

Uncrossed. О

Undisputed part of epitome

Third codicil

o

"3

12

Hall Crossed.

О

о

у

I6

IO

11

2

6

In the skilful hands of the Lord ChiefJustice of England, these figures secured a verdict for the defendants. — LEX.

THE SACRED TWELVE. 'T'HE institution of trial by jury is regarded -*by modern lawyers with less awe and complacency than were formerly deemed to be decent and appropriate. In civil causes a jury has already ceased to be the machinery most commonly employed for the determina tion of issnes of fact, and even in criminal trials the bold voice of the reformer has begun to cry for alterations and innovation. Attention has lately been pointedly directed to some of the peculiarities of the jury sys tem by the remand of a half-tried murderer until the following sessions because a juror went home to lunch, and by the adjourn ment for weeks of the Hansard Case after a great number of persons had been engaged for many days in partly trying it. It may be interesting to note how these peculiari ties have obtained their place in our law. The unanimity of the jury in criminal cases, either for acquittal or conviction, has long, perhaps always, been regarded as essential, although a passage in Britton has been understood to suggest that in his day (when jurors still decided on their own knowledge) a dissenting minority was some times taken out of the jury and replaced by other jurors if they swore they knew nothing about the matter. And few English lawyers would be prepared to go beyond Sir J. F. Stephen's proposal to accept the verdict of a considerable majority, but only where it was for acquittal and where no unanimous ver

dict could be procured. In civil cases, however, it seems clear that, in and before the reign of Edward I., the judge could take the verdict of a majority; but it was settled before the end of the fourteenth century that this was not the law, the judges ruling that "if there be eleven agreed, and but one dis senting, who says that he would rather die in prison, yet the verdict shall not be taken by eleven, no, nor yet the refuser fined and imprisoned; and therefore where such a ver dict was taken by eleven, and the twelfth fined and imprisoned, it was upon great advice ruled that the verdict was void, and the twelfth man delivered, and a new venire awarded; for men are not to be forced to give their verdict against their judgment." In spite, however, of the apparent fairness of this last sentiment, it was long held to be the duty of the' sheriff to send jurors who could not agree after the judge in a cart as he went round circuit, and to deny them fire and food until their judgments accorded. It was not, indeed, finally settled until 1866, though first decided a century earlier, that if the judge, despairing of an agreement being reached, discharged a jury in a crimi nal case, the prisoner could be put upon his trial again. The " patriarchal and apostolical number of twelve," as the proper and only admis sible number for a jury trying cases according to the common law, has come down to us