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WOMEN LAWYERS. — In a proceeding entitled In re Leach, decided in the Supreme Court of Indiana, in June. 1893, it was held that a provision of the Constitution and Revised Statutes of that State, that every person of good moral character, being a voter, shall be entitled to admission to the bar, and shall on application be admitted, on prescribed conditions, does not, by implication, exclude women from the practice of the law, there being no common law inhibition, and it being elsewhere provided in the Constitution that no privileges- shall be granted to any citizen which shall not on the same terms belong to all citizens. The court said: — "We have searched in vain for any expression from the common law excluding women from the profession of the law. Whatever the objections of the common law of England, there is a law higher in this country, and better suited to the rights and liberties of American citizens, — that law which accords to every citizen the natural right to gain a livelihood by intelligence, honesty, and industry in the arts, the sciences, the professions, or other vocations. This right may not, of course, be pursued in violation of law, but must be held to exist as long as not forbidden by law. We are not unmindful that other States — notably Illinois, Wisconsin. Oregon. Maryland, and Massachusetts — have held that, in the absence of an express grant of the privilege, it may not be conferred upon women. In some instances the holding has been upon constitutional provisions unlike that of this State, and in others, upon what we are constrained to believe an erroneous recogni tion of a supposed common law inhibition. However, each of the States named made haste to create by legisla tion the right which it was supposed was forbidden by the common law, and thereby recognized the progress of American women beyond the narrow limits prescribed in Westminster Hall. . . . The fact that the framers of the Constitution, or the legislators, in enacting our statute, did not anticipate a condition of society when women might desire to enter the profession of law for a liveli hood, cannot prevail as against their right to do so inde pendently of either. As said by the Supreme Court of Connecticut, in considering this question : ' If we hold that the construction of the statute is to be determined by the admitted fact that its application to women was not in the minds of the legislators when it was passed, where shall we draw the line / All progress in social matters is gradual. We pass almost imperceptibly from a state of public opinion that utterly condemns some course of action to one that strongly approves it. At what point in the history of this change shall we regard a statute, the construction of which is to be affected by it, as passed in contemplation of it? ' (In re Hall, 50 Conn. 131.) Our position is not that the constitutional and legislative grants of power to practise were adopted with a view to including women, but that such provision simply affirmed the right of the voter, without even an implied denial of it to women. Whatever disabilities existed as to married women, under the common law, they did not affect the rights of unmarried women; and now that mar ried women are under no legal disability in this State, as to the choice of honorable pursuits, both are to be con sidered as occupying the same position before the law."

BETTING ON BASEBALL. — In Mace v State, Supreme Court of Arkansas, in July. 1893, it was held (two judges dissenting) that baseball is a game of skill, within a statute making it a criminal offence to bet on a game of hazard or skill. That seems unanswerable. " A game of baseball " is a very common phrase, and it requires skill to play it, especially to "throw" it. One might well argue too that it is a game of hazard, — at all events, it is a hazardous game. The court said, speaking of the passion for gambling, "The Indian will stake his wife, and the ancient German would stake himself" to gratify it. The Indian undoubtedly would also "stake " his captive. "Gaming" has been held to include quoits and billiards and tenpins, but not a horse-race. Probably, however, a contest of polo would be construed a game of skill, as it is a mix ture of racing and skill. Baseball has been held construed a " sport " in New York. The principal decision is precisely supported by reference to Peo ple v. Weitnoff. 51 Mich. 208, where Judge Coolev held baseball '• a game of skill or chance." EDITOR AND CONTRIBUTOR. — The London " Law Journal" brings news of a novel contention between these parties. The plaintiff, Mr. W. A. Macdonald. a Canadian journalist, sought to recover from the proprietors of the "National Review" the price of an article which he had written and submitted to the editor's consideration, c.v proprio tnotu, and which had been set up in type, sent to him for correction, and returned revised. The article was not published within what Mr. Macdonald deemed '• a reasonable time;" he complained of its non-appearance, and got back the manuscript, with an implied refusal to insert it, by return of post. The plaintiff contended that by putting his manuscript in type and sending him a proof for revision, the editor had in law "accepted '' his article, and was bound to publish or pay for it within a reasonable time. The defendants, on the other hand, maintained, and adduced what appears to have been strong evidence to prove that this position was, according to journalistic custom, untenable But his Honor Judge Lumley Smith agreed with the plaintiff, and held that to print a manuscript and send the author a proof (presumably) for correction, is to exercise over it the dominium which constitutes an acceptance in law. " We are far from satisfied that the judgment in this case is sound," says the " Law Journal." But pray, why not? The putting in type and sending for correc tion is always an indication of intention to publish speedily; any custom to the contrary would be un reasonable and absurd, and therefore illegal. Grant ing this, the liability to payment within a reasonable time follows as a legal consequence. It is very different from the custom not to pay for accepted articles until published.