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 Rh EXEMPLARY DAMAGES ACJAINST CORPORATIONS — We are quite in sympathy with the " American Law Review" in its criticisms upon the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Railroad Co. v. Prentice, 147 U. S. 101, that a corporation is not liable in exemplary damages for a wanton and malicious tort committed by its servant, unless it author ized or approved the commission of the tort, although the servant would have been liable in such damages This is substantially equivalent to absolving corpo rations in such cases. A carrier corporation ought to be held at all hazards in exemplary damages in such cases, in order to teach it the duty of protecting helpless persons, who have entrusted themselves to its care, from dangerous attacks at the hands of its employees. Possibly, however, the evil of this de cision is cured by the concession of the court that damages in such cases may be awarded for mental suffering, for juries are quite apt to regard this means of vindicating the citizen's rights. But in theory we regard it as erroneous to say that a corporation is not liable in exemplary damages unless it has in some official way authorized or ratified the wrong act. DELIVERY OF GOODS; WHEN TITLE PASSES. — In Kelsea v. Ramsey and Gore Manufacturing Co, the New Jersey Court of Errors and Appeals held, in June last, that under a contract for the manufacture and sale of goods, with instructions by the purchaser to the vendor to send them to the purchaser at an other town, title passes on delivery to a common carrier to be transported, so that the vendor may maintain an action for the price, and is not limited to an action of damages for breach of contract if the purchaser refuses to accept the goods. The court -said : — "Although the cases upon this subject are not entirely in accord, the authorities generally hold that a delivery to a common carrier of the goods, properly addressed to the vendee, is a delivery to the vendee, subject to the ven dor's right of stoppage in transito, and to the vendee's right to reject for nonconformity to the contract. ( Brown v. Hodgson, 2 Camp. 37; Dutton ->. Solomonson, 3 Bos. & P. 582, Dunlop v. Lambert, б Clark & F. 600; Fragano v. Long, 4 Barn. & C. 219; Dawes v. Peck, 8 Term R. 330; Krulder7;. Ellison, 47 N. ¥.36; Silver Plate Co. v. Green, 72 N. V. 17; Spencer v. Hale, 30 Vt. 316; Stanton •i.: Eagcr, 16 Pick. 467; Hunter v. Wright, 12 Allen, 548; Hall v. Richardson, 16 Md. 396, Magruder v. Gage, 33 Md 344, i Benj. Sales, §§ 161, 181; Story Sales, § 306; 2 Kent Comm. 499 ) The distinction is made in sonic of these cases, that, in order to give to the delivery to the carrier the effect of a delivery to the buyer, the carrier must be selected or named by the buyer. When the con tract of the manufacturer is simply to make the goods at an agreed price, he has fully executed the agreement on his part when the goods are produced at his factory,

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ready to be delivered on demand. In that case, howevei, he is not authorized by the vendee to deliver them for transportation. Hut when the purchaser instructs the vendor to send the goods to him, it docs not appear how it makes any difference in the rule applicable to the case whether he names the carrier or not If the carrier is not specified, the vendor, acting in this respect under the or der of the purchaser to forward the goods, is his agent in the selection of the carrier, and in either case the carrier is, in contemplation of law, chosen by the purchaser In this case the purchasers expressly instructed the plaintiff to send the goods from New Hampshire to I'aterson. When the goods passed out of the possession of the plaintiff into the hands of the carrier, who must be re garded as the agent of the purchasers to transport them, the transfer of the title to the purchasers became com plete, and all the rights of ownership in them passed to the purchasers. If the carrier had converted the goods to his own use. the defendants could have maintained an action for them; or, if there had been a loss in transit, it would have fallen on them."

WIDOWS NOT FAVORED. — It is generally sup posed that women are practically, although not theo retically, favored in the law. A New York judge once justified a very doubtful ruling on a question of evidence in a railroad accident case, on the ground that '• this court will always lean strongly toward the widow." But it seems that widows are not quite so leniently viewed ¡n South Carolina; for in Hcrndon v. Gibson, 17 S. E. Rep. 145, the Supreme Court held, that where on a mortgage sale of lands a widow, dependent upon the property for her support, requested the bystanders not to bid against her, and she bought in the premises without opposition, the sale w.is void. It seems to have been differently held in Woody i'. Smith. 65 N. C. 116, in the ab sence of proof that the auctioneer connived with the widow But this is only one of a considerable number of radical differemes between the Carolinas in legal notions. The "American Law Review'' observes on this case that " the Supreme Court can not compel the people of South Carolina to bid against a widow in humble circumstances," and asks, " How many successive sales will the Supreme Court set aside for that reason? " Now. we should arrange on the second, if not on the first, sale to have some of the widow's friends — say some of the "mourners " or contingent second husbands — make a few modest bids in opposition, and privately coax off other bidders. That is what we should do if we were counsel for the widow : but quite unfortunately we cannot be everywhere at once, and act for all the distressed widows in the country. By the way, a quite interesting chapter might be written on "The Law of Widows," — say by Mr. R. Yashon Rogers. Of course, the writer should weed out all the law pertaining to married women.