Page:The Green Bag (1889–1914), Volume 04.pdf/87

 The Green Bag,

7o Samuel Lumpkin.

Justice Lumpkin is a son of Joseph Henry Lumpkin, who was a nephew of Chief-Jus tice Lumpkin and of Gov. Wilson Lumpkin. No name in Georgia is more highly honored than the one he bears. Judge Lumpkin was a member of the State Senate in 1878-79, and as Chairman of the Committee on Railroads participated largely in framing the excellent Railroad Commis sion Law, which has been in force since that date. He was elected Judge of the Northern Circuit in 1884; re-elected, without opposi tion, in 1888, and was recently, at the age of forty-two, elected to the Supreme Bench, without opposition. At the time this article is written, none of Judge Lumpkin's decisions have been pub lished. His long and successful career as Circuit Judge, followed by the compliment of a unanimous election to the Supreme Bench, is universally regarded as the proph ecy of a distinguished service in this tribunal. The pang of losing his dearest case is soft ened for the lawyer who believes that the judge has listened well to all that he has said. Judge Lumpkin's manner on the bench will always afford that mitigation to counsel disappointed by a decision. [The interval elapsing between the prepa ration and publication of this sketch permits a reference by way of postscript to some of Judge Lumpkin's opinions. Good specimens of his judicial work are the decisions in Ozburn v. The State, 13 S. E. Rep. 247; Johnson v. Bradstreet Co., Ibid. 250; O'Connell v. E. T. V. & G. R. R. Co., Ibid. 489; Pritchard v. Savannah St. R. R. Co., Ibid. 493. In the second case cited, the question was whether an action for libel survived the death of the plaintiff, under a statute pro viding that " no action for . . . injury to the person . . . shall abate by death." Judge Lumpkin says : — "' Person ' is a broad term, and legally includes, not only the physical body and members, but also

every bodily sense and personal attribute, among which is the reputation a man has acquired. Rep utation is a sort of right to enjoy the good opinion of others, and is capable of growth and real exist ence, as an arm or leg. If it is not to be classed as a personal right, where does it belong? No provision has been made for any middle class of injuries between those to person and those to property, and the great body of wrongs arrange themselves under the one head or the other. Whether viewed from the artificial arrangement of law-writers or the standpoint of common-sense, an injury to reputation is an injury to person; and oftentimes an injury of this sort causes far more pain and unhappiness, to say nothing of actual loss of money or property, than any physical in jury could possibly occasion. As already sug gested, it is of great importance to arrive, if possible, at the intention of the Legislature as to the meaning to be given to the words, ' injury to person.' We have endeavored to show that the legislative intent may, to some extent, be arrived at by reference to the place in the code which the amended section occupies; and we have also endeavored to show that the common-law meaning of the words, ''injury to person,' includes libel, slander, and the like. Having reached this point in the discussion, we may also invoke another rule for the construction of statutes, namely, that where words have a definite and well-settled meaning at common law, it is to be presumed, unless some good reason to the contrary appears, that this same meaning attaches to them when used in a statute."] Thomas J. Simmons. Justice Simmons came to the bench after long and distinguished service in the State Senate and upon the Circuit Bench. His mind is characterized by that rare and valu able faculty " the genius of common-sense." His intellect intuitively perceives the sub stance of the case, and is under no temptation to get away from it. This is the tempera ment that makes safe and conservative judges. His associate in judicial work, the Chief-Justice, has alluded in a public address to the dangers of the subtle type of intellect He says : " By nothing are we so sure of be ing deluded as by subtle and ingenious argu