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 The Supreme Court of North Carolina.

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Mr. Reverdy Johnson in the second argu General v. Guilford, lb. 315, is discussed a ment of Ex parte Garland before the United subject which is still sometimes a vexata quesStates Supreme Court, — a case involving tio in this State, and the Chief-Justice holds the power of Congress by a test oath to therein that the county authorities are not exclude lawyers from practice in that court bound to grant license to retail spirituous for participation (on the Southern side) in liquors to every one who proves a good the late war between the States, and upon moral character, nor have they, on the which Mr. Johnson won his case. In State other hand, the arbitrary power to refuse at v. Benton, 19 N. C. 196, he established their will all applicants for license, if prop clearly the practice as to trials for homicide erly qualified; and further, that the county and challenges to jurors. In Railroad v. authorities, having a discretion to a certain Davis, 19 N. C. 452, he established the doc extent in granting such licenses, a manda trine (then a new one) of the right of the mus will not lie to compel them to grant a legislature to provide for condemnation of a license to any particular individual, though right of way for railroad purposes, and that he may have been improperly refused a in such cases the land-owner did not have license, the only remedy, if the license is a constitutional right to a trial by jury to perversely and obstinately denied, being by assess the damages, but was remitted to indictment. Apropos of this, counsel for the whatever mode of assessment might be pro applicant to retail, in one of the recent vided by the legislature, and that payment cases in this State, observed with much of compensation did not necessarily precede naivet/ that he did not understand the object the taking possession of the right of way. of this requirement, and that he did not see In Irby v. Wilson, 21 N. C. 568, in a very why a man needed a good moral character able opinion, he maintains that while the to qualify him to sell intoxicating liquors. domicile of the husband is that of the wife Fleming v. Burgin, 37 N. C. 584, maintains for some purposes, yet where they have the proposition that actual notice of an adverse interests, as in a suit between them,. unregistered incumbrance does not affect a her domicile is where she actually resides; subsequent incumbrance or purchase for and that hence in an action for divorce, value. In State v. Boyce, 32 N. C. 536, is where a wife had left the State for many a very interesting discussion of the right of years, a decree of divorce obtained by the the owner of slaves to permit them to meet husband in the State where he continued to and dance on his premises on Christmas reside, without actual service upon the wife, eve and other holidays without being re is a nullity. In Webb v. Fulchire, 25 N. C. sponsible for keeping a disorderly house. 485, is laid down the proposition that where He says: "We may let them make the most a man is cheated out of his money, though of their idle hours, and may well make it is in playing at a game forbidden by law, allowances for the noisy outpourings of glad he may recover back what he has paid from hearts, which Providence bestows as a bless the person who practised the fraud upon ing on corporeal vigor united to a vacant him. The game in this case was " three-card mind. . . . There was nothing contrary to monte," and the learned Judge seems as much morals or law in all that, adding as it did to puzzled as to how the trick was worked as human enjoyment, without hurt to any one, the simple-minded plaintiff himself. State unless it be that one feels aggrieved that v. Rives, 27 N. C. 297, is a very interesting these poor people should for a short space decision, which holds that while the interest be happy at finding the authority of the of a railroad company in its right of way can master give place to his benignity, and at being freed from care and filled with glad be sold under execution, the corporate fran chise is not liable to such sale. In Attorney- ness." 60