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JOHN K. PORTER. By Grosvenor P. Lowrey. II. JUDGE PORTER was appointed by Gov ernor Fenton in 1865 to the Bench of the Court of Appeals, to fill the vacancy caused by the death of Judge William W. Wright. The offer of this place was promptly accepted, since it opened a way to a severance of existing partnership rela tions, which he had for some time contem plated. The appointment had no political significance or consequence. I have heard it said of Judge Porter that he was too much of an advocate to be a good judge. That judgment was not well consid ered. A perusal of his opinions will, I think, show that as a judge he has had no superior on the bench in this State, and few peers. His mental constitution and his moral and mental vigor forbade him to dally with a question when he once saw its solution clearly; and he always did see it clearly before he began to write. In consulting his judicial writings, the reader will not find it necessary to struggle painfully through pages of balanced propositions, now guessing right and now guessing wrong, as to what the eventual judgment is to be. It is always manifest from the outset what is to be the outcome, and space is occupied solely in an nouncing reasons for the foreseen conclu sion. This uncompromising certainty of expression does not hide from the intelli gent reader the clear and gentle light of judgment which shines through it all. A certain quality in his opinions does show that on the bench as at the bar, sophistry received his prompt condemnation, and sometimes assurance of his scorn, — and that may to some temperaments seem un judicial. Turning by chance to the Reports, I find Herrick v. Van Santvoordt, 34 N. Y., a good I1

example of this. saying : —

The opinion begins by

"The defendant Van Santvoordt was not a party to the contract with the proprietors of the Cam den, and he did not navigate the steamboat by which that vessel was towed. He neither owned nor chartered the Cayuga, nor did he take any part, as agent or otherwise, in chartering it. He was held liable on the sole ground that he was a stockholder, etc. ... To connect the defendant with the liability, the court below found it neces sary to hold, in substance : (1) That there was such a corporation as the Steam Navigation Com pany; to the end that he might be bound, as a shareholder, by the corporate acts of its officers. (2) That there was no such corporation; to the end that he might be held responsible as a partner for debts contracted, and for torts committed by other persons assuming to act in its name." Perhaps the judge who was overruled in that case may have thought Porter had too much the habit of an advocate. I have space to refer to only one other opinion, which has always seemed to me to be a model of judicial decision, the opinion in the case of People v. Roper, 35 N. Y. 631. Upon this opinion I am willing to rest a claim for Judge Porter's judicial eminence. That judgment seems conceived in the spirit of loftiest statesmanship, applied to a minor situation in political affairs, and is expressed with impressive dignity and a persuasive eloquence, which are alike fitting to great and small occasions when arising under the administration of a scheme of free government. I was before Judge Porter in his magis terial capacity only once. That was for the argument of the case of Hoffman v. ^Etna Insurance Company, reported 32 N. Y. 405. George C. Barrett had been counsel upon