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another generalization; that they constitute a tort, a contract, a crime, a lawful act, as the case may be. But while the general sense of each term is plain, its exact boundaries are not authoritatively defined until actual cases arise calling for such definitions. Along these boundary lines occur the doubtful questions of the law, the controversies whether one definition or the other should em brace a disputed point; and most of the rules of law stated in our books are the answers to these. "No one lawyer thinks of looking for a text or a rule as the highest authority in any case which is brought before the court. His first object is to ascertain what are the facts upon which his client claims relief or interposes a defence. In these facts there is nothing as yet which suggests a rule of law. They must be reduced to legal or ulti mate facts before the law can take notice of them at all. The law, like any other science, does not deal with individual cases, or with what it terms evidential facts. These must be brought under some general conception which the law has made the foundation of a liability before any authoritative rule can take notice of it. "Hence the work of the lawyer must always mainly be with the legal facts or conceptions in the relations between which the law consists. All his advice to a client, every selection of a remedy, every statement in a pleading, and, in short, all his work of any value to others must depend upon his accurate conception of these ultimate facts, and of the system of rights and duties which they constitute. Hence all study of the law must eventually resolve itself into the definition and contents of these general conception?. When the student knows exactly what is a contract or a promissory note or a judgment, what is a trespass or a crime, what is a hereditament or a chattel, and so on, he has the material for the work which he is to do in law. The only remaining question is, by what means the thorough mastery of these conceptions, which are really the principles of the law, may be acquired. Can there be any doubt that they should be the first things taught to the beginner? Elementary law is only another name for them, or, rather, for the comprehensive and harmonious system composed of them. That sys tem is harmonious, because all its rules depend on the general conceptions in which the whole people

agree. Is it not equally clear that the special ap plications to particular facts, and especially such parts of them as depend merely upon the decis ions of the courts, should be kept back until the principles of law are thoroughly fixed in the mind of the student? With regard to the method of study, it must always depend upon the circum stances of each school, and upon the teachers; but we would strongly recommend that every teacher in a law-school should present an outline of the subject taught, in a printed form, which the students may master as thoroughly as possible, and should occupy the hours spent with the class in such references and illustrations as would aid them in clearly comprehending these fundamental principles, and in sufficient examinations to con vince himself that they have done so. The use of cases in illustration of these principles is of unquestionable service, and gives a precision to the knowledge of the student which he hardly could obtain otherwise; but we deprecate the use of cases alone without reference to the fundamen tal principles of the law of which we believe them to be in all cases the application. The law is not made by cases in any other sense than as every science is created by the thought and experiments of the men who pursue it. The historical growth of the law may undoubtedly be traced more accu rately in the decisions of the courts than in anyother manner; but -the logical unity of the system, and the harmony of one decision with another, present another and different mode of study which it would be very unwise to neglect. The only real test of a rule of the common law must be its consistency with other rules, or the harmony of the entire system. If two rules lead to different results in any case, they cannot both be parts of the common law; and if both are allowed to re main, or be taught as authoritative, the only result must be a discrepancy in the decisions derived from them. For this reason we should urge that both methods of teaching should be employed in their proper relation in the course, — the historical method for the purpose of showing how our pres ent conception of the common law has come to be what it is, the logical method for the purpose of showing the relation of the rules of law to each other, and the mode in which they are all derived from certain great principles."