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 The Supreme Court of Rhode Island. right of trial by jury is a fundamental right which the General Assembly cannot take away. The reasons given were not satis factory to the General Assembly, but the judges were allowed to serve out their year, though they were not honored with a re election. The decision, however, resulted in the repeal of the statute; and " thence forth the independence of the judiciary be

came, notwithstanding the judges continued long to be annually elected, one of the grand traditions of the State, carrying with it the authority almost of constitutional law."1 During the entire period of government under the Charter, and for more than a dec ade under the Consti tution, the General As sembly exercised judi cial powers which have from time to time been transferred to the Su preme Court. Thus until 1822 the appel late jurisdiction in matters of probate continued in the Gov ernor and Council, as "supreme ordinary or judge of probates." In the year named this jurisdiction was trans ferred to the Supreme Court, where it has since remained. The General Assembly also exercised jurisdiction in matters of appeal and petitions for new trial. The right of appeal was granted in 1680, to any party aggrieved by any judgment of the Supreme Court. The right of appeal to the General Assembly was repealed in 1741; but jurisdiction on petitions for new trials continued to be exercised until some years after the adop1 Durfee's Gleanings from the Judicial History of Rhode Island.

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tion of the Constitution. New trials were granted, not only for the usual reasons, but for almost any cause including errors of law committed by the court. The assembly continued to entertain pe titions for divorce until a late day, and it exercised various phases of equity jurisdiction until the adoption of the Constitution in 1843. By a judicious admixture of legis lation with its judicial action, the assembly, with little deference to precedents and rules of law, aimed to do jus tice between parties. The Constitution adopted in 1843 pro vided that the " Gen eral Assembly shall continue to exercise the powers they have heretofore exercised, unless prohibited in this Constitution." It seems to have been taken for granted that this clause continued in the assembly the judicial powers for merly exercised by it. Along with this grant of power to the legisla tive department was the provision that "the judicial power of this State shall be vested in one supreme court and in such inferior courts as the General Assembly may from time to time ordain and establish." In January, 1857, an act was passed by the General Assembly directing the clerk of the Supreme Court to write across the record of their judgment against Thomas W. Dorr, convicting him of treason, the words, " Reversed and annulled by order of the General Assembly, at their January session, a. d. 1854." The following year there was a change in the political com plexion of the assembly; and the court being