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DOGS OR MEN? A JUDICIAL opinion is one of those things which are not supposed to find a resting-place in the columns of the "Green Bag," but the following masterly ex position of law, delivered as the opinion of the Supreme Court of Michigan in the case of Heisrodt v. Hackett, by Judge Marston, is certainly worthy of preservation in an " en tertaining" magazine. We are indebted to our esteemed contemporary the " Central Law Journal" for the opinion, the humor having been wholly expunged in the official report. The head-note, which is certainly up to the standard desired by brother Sey mour D. Thompson, is as follows : — 1. Dogs are neither " Persons " nor " Con stables." — A statute permitting "any person," and requiring " police officers," to kill unlicensed dogs, does not justify one dog in killing another of his own motion. 2. Licensed Dogs. — Where a dog is known to be licensed, the loss of his collar does not de prive him of the protection of the statute, until a reasonable time is allowed his owner to discover the loss and make it good. Opinion of the Court by Marston, J. "The plaintiff in this case was engaged in the business of raising berries for market. His profits depended largely upon protecting the berries from naughty birds, who, having no moral or conscientious scruples or respect for plaintiff's interests, would sometimes de scend, and without leave or license appro priate the berries to their own use. To prevent such high-handed dealings the plain tiff became the owner and possessor of a small, amiable, and intelligent dog, with val uable hunting qualities. This dog, when the birds attempted to steal or take the ber ries, would at once warn them of the danger they incurred; and they, upon seeing him approach, would immediately withdraw with out waiting for the honor of a near acquaint ance, so that not one of them would get a peck of the berries during the whole season.

"This dog had business everywhere around the plaintiff's premises, in watching and pro tecting them, bolting in and out of all the rat-holes, catching and killing the occupants if he could, but at the risk of soiling or losing his collars by the operation. "There was a large, savage, and dangerous dog, a cross between a bull-dog and a mas tiff, living near by the plaintiff's residence. This was a dog without an owner; he was permitted to live, and was taken care of on defendant's premises. Upon the first day of January, 1875, he went out making calls. The same day the plaintiff's little dog was out attending to his duties, pursuing or chas ing a flock of snow-birds from off plaintiffs fields and berries, and while engaged in this laudable business, he followed the birds across the highway and into the field,of a neighbor, where it does not appear there were any berries. While there, defendant's dog wilfully and maliciously attacked him, and with dangerous weapons, to wit, his teeth, so bit and injured the plaintiff's dog that his bark was shattered; he went home in a languishing condition, and languishing, upon the same day did die. Plaintiff there upon sued defendant to recover damages for the irreparable loss which he had sustained. "The defendant justified his dog in what he had done under the statute of 1873. Upon this branch of the case the court charged the jury as follows: — "' By the law of 1873 then in force, the owner of dogs was required to have a license running from the 1st of April of each year to the 1st of April of the following year; and also to cause such dog to wear a collar around his neck during the life of the license and no longer; and it is made lawful for any person, and also the duty of certain officers, to kill any and all dogs going at large and not licensed and collared according to the provisions of this act. If you find as a mat ter of fact that the plaintiff's dog was not licensed and was not collared within the law, the collar