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 The Green Bag.

Vol. II. No. 6.

BOSTON.

June, 1890.

MR. JUSTICE CAMPBELL.

By Hon. Henry B. Brown.

HE sudden and wholly unexpected death of Mr. Justice James V. Camp bell, of the Supreme Court of Michigan, removes from that bench its oldest member, both in years and length of service, and one who has contributed as much as any other to establish its fame as the leading judicial tribunal of the West.

Judge Campbell was born in Buffalo, N. Y., Feb. 25, 1823, and consequently had completed his sixty-seventh year. His father removed to Detroit when he was but three years of age, and from that time until his death he was thoroughly identified with the history and growth of the State. He was admitted to the bar in 1844, was immediately taken into one of the leading firms, and soon established a successful and lucrative practice. Upon the reorganization of the Supreme Court in 1857, — an act which was virtually the creation of a new court, — he was, at the early age of thirty-four, elected one of its justices, and was by successive re-elections continued upon the bench until his death.

He brought to the discharge of his new duties a complete equipment of judicial qualifications, as masterful a knowledge of the law as was possible in one of his years, a fixed habit of industry, an amiable temper, unblemished integrity, an innate love of justice, and that delicate appreciation of what justice demands, known as the judicial temperament, which is of more value upon the bench than brilliant parts or profound learning. He was conservative in his nature, a champion of whatever the experience of ages had shown to be safe and wise, and looked with distrust upon any change which savored of an encroachment upon time-honored principles of justice.

He loved the common law of England, the law as administered by Coke and Mans field and Kenyon. He loved its principles, its pleadings, its practice, its juries, its judgments. He had a tender side even for its technicalities, especially when put forward in defence of the liberty of the citizen. He was a stanch defender of the sanctity of the person and domicil, and was never so happy in his opinions as when vindicating his immunity from arrest without warrant, and his right to a trial according to the ancient forms of the law. He was even accused of an undue leaning toward the criminal, although his opinions went no further than to insure him fair treatment and the unbiased judgment of his peers. Upon these points he was inflexible, and in one of his latest official utterances (People v. McCord, 76 Mich. 200), he criticised with unexampled severity the unfair methods used in the detection of a crime. He had no sympathy with crime or criminals; his sole desire was to see that justice was done them.

He loved the rights of the people secured to them by the Constitution, and was quick to resent an invasion of its immunities. He loved its spirit as well as its letter, — what it implied as well as what it expressed. He believed that back of all constitutions there were immutable principles of justice, which legislatures as well as individuals were bound 31