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 Animadversion of Counsel by the Court. Protesting against attempts at mystifying the merits of a case by such records, we shall proceed to notice the single error which it is supposed that the court has committed in the charge to the jury. — Grier, J. Evans v. Patterson, 4 Wall. 224. This case is encumbered by a mass of inartificial pleadings, and it is difficult to ascertain from them what is the question intended to be presented to us.— Chapman, C. J. Taft v. Ward, 106 Mass. 523. It is necessary to dissipate the cloud of plead ing in which this case is enveloped, in order to form a distinct idea of the questions intended to be brought to the view of the court below. Unfor tunately, as not unfrequently happens in this com plex and injudicious mode of conducting a suit with all the clerical skill displayed by counsel in multiplying their counts and pointing their bills of exceptions, the principal questions are really at last not brought to the view of the court. — Johnson, J. Dunlop v. Monroe, 7 Cranch, 242. It is probably because this case originated in a State court, that the court below permitted the counsel to turn the case into a written wrangle, in stead of requiring them to plead as lawyers in a court of common law. We had occasion already to notice the consequences resulting from the in troduction of this hybrid system of pleading (so called) into the administration of justice in Texas. (See Toby v. Randon, 11 How. 517, and Bennet v. Butterworth, 11 How. 667, with remarks on the same in McFaul v. Ramsay, 20 How. 525.) This case adds another to the examples of the utter per plexity and confusion of mind introduced into the administration of justice, by practice under such codes. — Grier, J. Green v. Custard, 23 How. 484. The whole argument of the counsel for the plainriff is founded on a fallacy. — Bigelow, J. Calder v. Kurby, 5 Gray, 590. The pleadings and brief in this case exhibit an astuteness upon minor points hardly to be ex pected, and certainly not required from a State where a code of practice is in force. The real question presented by the demurrer arises upon the construction of a written contract. The ques tion made upon the form of the pleadings is quite unimportant. — Hunt, J. Evansv. &c. R. R. v. Androscoggin Mills, 22 Wall. 594. [N. B. — Mr. Wallace, the reporter, took the liberty of omitting this paragraph with which the opinion opens. It forms, however, a part of the original opinion, as published at the time, and it is

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to be found in the Lawyer's Co-operative Co.'s Volume, book xxii. p. 725.] In the view we take of this case we are not re quired to wade through the various statutes of Missouri, and the decisions of the courts of the State, in order to determine whether or not the proceedings in question are valid. — Davis, J. McQuiddy v. Wade, 20 Wall. 17. The bill of exceptions in this case is made up without any regard to the rules in accordance with which such bills should be framed. It is little else than a transcript of the evidence, oral and docu mentary, given at the trial, and covering ninety-six printed pages of the record, when the exceptions could have been presented with greater clearness and precision in any five of them. In" its prepara tion counsel seem to have forgotten that this court does not pass, in actions at law, upon the credi bility or sufficiency of testimony, etc. — Field, J. Lincoln v. Claflin, 7 Wall. 136. The bill of exceptions furnishes the same ground of complaint which was remarked upon in Lincoln v. Claflin. . . . The points arising for our considera tion could have been better presented in a very small part of this space. Such a mass of unneces sary matter has a tendency to involve what is really important in obscurity and confusion. . . . Win nowing away the chaff, we find the questions left for our examination neither numerous nor difficult ofsolution. — Swayne, J. Laber v. Cooper, do. 568. The counsel on both sides have consumed much ink and paper in endeavoring to show the corrupt practices and dishonest motives of their adversaries' clients. We could not avoid reading all this. Conceding as a matter of courtesy the force and truth of all that is said on both sides, we have been unable to perceive its application to the construc tion of the code. — Swan, J. Union Bank of Roch ester v. Union Bank of Sandusky, 6 Ohio St. 262. We have no doubt that the complainant honestly believes that he has been greatly wronged by the defendant below, who has taken the liberty of breaking his promise with regard to a parol con tract for an exchange of property with the com plainant; but we had supposed that in the opinion just delivered, we had shown clearly to the satis faction of any person who did not suffer under some obliquity of mental vision, that by his own statement of his case the complainant had mis taken his remedy. In this case there was nothing shown but a breach of promise and a scrambling