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268 NOTES.

Legislature of Massachusetts seems to have had decidedly the better of the Supreme Court in its recent encounter with that august body. The Court, having been asked by the House of Representatives for its opinion upon some points of doubtful construction in the Statute providing for the education of the youth of the Commonwealth, declined to give an opinion, denying the constitutional authority of the House to require the same. The Committee to whom the reply of the Justices was referred say:—

Whereas, On the nineteenth day of April last this House of Representatives ordered that the opinion of the Justices of the Supreme Judicial Court be required upon certain important questions of law relating to the construction of certain statutes providing for the education of children in the Commonwealth; and

Whereas, On the fourth day of May instant, said Justices did send a reply to this House, not answering said question, but denying the constitutional authority of this House to require their opinions upon the same: now, therefore, be it

Resolved, That the House of Representatives does not acquiesce in the conclusion of the Justices as to the limitation of the authority of the House to require the opinions of the Justices; and affirms the authority of the House under the Constitution to require their opinions upon said questions.

It is with reluctance that your Committee venture to express an opinion at variance with that of the Justices, and with the greatest deference for their wisdom and learning; but after such inquiry as they have been able to make they have unanimously reached the following conclusion: That this House was justified in regarding the questions relating to the statute which provides for the education of the future citizens of the Commonwealth as important questions of law; that when it was confronted with the duty of considering the propriety of changing this law, a proper occasion arose, if it so decided, for it to require the opinion of the Justices upon points of doubtful construction, within the fair meaning of the words themselves of the Constitution, and as they have been interpreted by the Justices in past times, and as they are illustrated by the practice of the Government from which we have received, and the Commonwealth to which we have given, our laws.

For these reasons, imperfectly stated, the Committee report the accompanying Resolve.

A New York millionnaire recently died, and whenhis will was read it was found to contain the following curious clause: "If any one of my heirs becomes idle, a drunkard, a gambler, or a worthless fellow, a rascal, or simply a spendthrift, if until the age of fifty he does not go to business by nine in the morning every day, save Sunday or holidays, if he touches tobacco in any form, or spirits, if he attends races, breaks the Sabbath, etc., he forfeits his right to the share allotted him of my fortune." Such a will as this is, of course, disputed by the heirs; but if it is held good, the heirs will have to look forward to a careful time of it. In our present highly artificial age it is not at all unfrequent to have eccentric testators, who puzzle the courts with strange bequests, often saddled with still stranger conditions. As a contemporary says, "The law in its wisdom has a happy way of treating all too fastidious conditions as if they did not exist; and, thanks to this useful discretion, heirs and legal representatives have frequently to thank the law for attributing to their ancestors much wiser intentions in dealing with their property than they ever possessed."—The Law Journal (London).

has been administered to dogs by suffocation in coal-gas with perfect success. This death, as far as can be known, is absolutely painless. The writer has several times been rendered totally insensible by inhaling gas, and can testify to the efficacy of the anæsthesia produced. Under its influence a perfectly quiet relapse into unconsciousness ensues, the last memory of events being clear and unclouded. Some such method of inflicting the death penalty would seem far in advance of the electric process. There would be a quick and painless unconsciousness, and the exposure could be so long as to insure a fatal result. It could be applied in an ordinary cell, with no special apparatus, and could even be applied to a criminal while sleeping. It would, above all, be infallible and certain, and would not mar or deface the body. The latter is always liable to happen with electricity.—Scientific American.

Commonwealth v. Williams, 105 Mass. 62, one Ball, who had been robbed, testified that defendant talked with him during the day and had a "very interesting, manly, pleasant, smooth, gentle, handsome voice,—a York State voice; "that about midnight he and his wife were awakened by the "pleasant voice" saying at their bedside: