Page:The Federalist (Ford).djvu/12

xii distinction between popular control and majority control, between limited and unlimited governments.

From this fear of populace and of state governments, qualified by the necessity of framing a government which should be based on both, came certain clauses of the constitution the convention framed, which made it the instrument it is. The legislature or Congress was split into two bodies, that each might act as a check on the other, and strong executive and judicial departments were created, armed against the legislative by the once hated royal powers of appointment, veto, and annulment, that they might maintain their independence of the lawmaking branch, and even limit its power. Having split the Congress, the lower branch was given to the people, while the upper was given to the state legislatures, thus opposing a barrier to the will of the state governments in the House and to the will of the people in the Senate. Not daring to trust either people or legislatures to choose a president, a select body of citizens was created, to whom the choice of that official was assigned, thus making a second defense from the populace or state legislatures. To the President was given the appointment of the judiciary, thus removing that department, by a second selection, three degrees from popular choice or influence. Roger Sherman's plea to the convention that "the people should have as little to do as may be about the government" seemed fulfilled.

But the minimizing of popular control was only half the restraint that the convention had to create. The powers of the state legislatures, as the tools of the majority, must be also curtailed, or they would encroach on the general government as they had on their own. The laws of the nation were made, as the parliament laws once were, superior to state laws. Power after power was swept from the states: they could keep no troops or navy; they could not coin money, emit bills of credit, or pass tender laws; they could not enact bills of attainder, ex post facto laws, or laws impairing the obligation of contract. Such were the chief limitations,