Page:The Federalist (1818).djvu/439

 article of the casting vote. In the national government, if the senate should be divided, no appointment could be made: in the government of New York, if the council should be divided, the governor can turn the scale and confirm his own nomination. If we compare the publicity which must necessarily attend the mode of appointment by the president and an entire branch of the national legislature, with the privacy in the mode of appointment by the governor of New York, closetted in a secret apartment with at most four, and frequently with only two persons; and if we at the same time consider how much more easy it must be to influence the small number of which a council of appointment consists, than the considerable number of which the national senate would consist, we cannot hesitate to pronounce, that the power of the chief magistrate of this state, in the disposition of offices, must, in practice, be greatly superior to that of the chief magistrate of the union.

Hence it appears, that, except as to the concurrent authority of the president in the article of treaties, it would be difficult to determine whether that magistrate would, in the aggregate, possess more or less power than the governor of New York. An I it appears yet more unequivocally, that there is no pretence for the parallel which has been attempted between him and the king of Great Britain. But to render the contrast, in this respect, still more striking, it may be of use to throw the principal circumstances of dissimilitude into a closer groupe.

The president of the United States would be an officer elected by the people for four years. The king of Great Britain is a perpetual and hereditary prince. The one would be amenable to personal punishment and disgrace: the person of the other is sacred and inviolable. The one would have a qualified negative upon the