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 not unaware of the circumstances which distinguish the American from other popular governments, as well ancient as modern ; and which render extreme circumspection necessary, in reasoning from the one case to the other. But after allowing due weight to this consideration, it may still be maintained, that there are many points of similitude which render these examples not unworthy of our attention. Many of the defects, as we have seen, which can only be supplied by a senatorial institution, are common to a numerous assembly frequently elected by the people, and to the people themselves. There are others peculiar to the former, which require the control of such an institution. The people can never wilfully betray their own interests: but they may possibly be betrayed by the representatives of the people; and the danger will be evidently greater, where the whole legislative trust is lodged in the hands of one body of men, than where the concurrence of separate and dissimilar bodies is required in every public act.

The difference most relied on, between the American and other republics, consists in the principle of representation, which is the pivot on which the former move, and which is supposed to have been unknown to the latter, or at least to the ancient part of them. The use which has been made of this difference, in reasonings contained in former papers, will have shown that I an disposed neither to deny its existence, nor to undervalue its importance. I feel the less restraint therefore in observing, that the position concerning the ignorance of the ancient governments on the subject of representation, is by no means precisely true, in the latitude commonly given to it. Without entering into a disquisition which here would be misplaced, 1 will refer to a few known facts in support of what I advance.

In the most pure democracies of Greece, many of the executive functions were performed, not by the people themselves, but by officers elected by the people, and representing them in their executive capacity.

Prior to the reform of Solon, Athens was governed by nine archons, annually elected by the people at large