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 characters in the state administrations, as are capable of preferring their own emolument and advancement to the public weal. With so effectual a weapon in then hands as the exclusive power of regulating elections for the national government, a combination of a few such men, in a few of the most considerable states, where the temptation will always be the strongest, might accomplish the destruction of the union; by seizing the opportunity of some casual dissatisfaction among the people, and which perhaps they may themselves have excited, to discontinue the choice of members for the federal house of representatives. It ought never to be forgotten that a firm union of this country, under an efficient government, will probably be an increasing object of jealousy to more than one nation of Europe; and that enterprises to subvert it will sometimes originate in the intrigues of foreign powers, and will seldom fail to be patronized and abetted by some of them. Its preservation therefore ought in no case, that can be avoided, to be committed to the guardianship of any but those, whose situation will uniformly beget an immediate interest in the faithful and vigilant performance of the trust.

PUBLIUS.

No. LX. BY ALEXANDER HAMILTON.

The same subject continued.

WE have seen, that an incontrolable power over the elections for the federal government could not, without hazard, be committed to the state legislatures. Let us now see what are the dangers on the other side; that is, from confiding the ultimate right of regulating its own elections to the union itself. It is not pretended that this right would ever be used for the exclusion of any state from its share in the representation. This interest of all would, in this respect at least, be the security of all. But it is alleged, that it might be employed in such a manner as to promote the election of