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 union, is quite as probable as a disposition in the union to encroach upon the rights of the state governments. What side would be likely to prevail in such a conflict, must depend on the means which the contending parties could employ, towards insuring success. As in republics, strength is always on the side of the people; and as there are weighty reasons to induce a belief^ that the state governments will commonly possess most influence over tliem, the natural conclusion is, that such contests will ])e most apt to end to the disadvantage of the union ; and that there is greater probability of encroachments by the members upon the federal head, than by the federal head upon the members. But it is evident, that all conjectures of this kind must be extremely vague and fallible ; and that it is by far the safest course to lay them altogether aside ; and to confine our attention wholly to the nature and extent of the powers, as they are delineated in the constitution. Every thing beyond this, must be left to the prudence and firmness of the people; who, as they will hold the scales in their own hands, it is to be hoped, will always take care to preserve the constitutional equilibrium between the general and the state govern- ments. Upon this ground, which is evidently the true one, it will not be difficult to obviate the objections, which have been made to an indefinite power of taxation in the United States.

PUBLIUS.

No. XXXII.

BY ALEXANDER HAMILTON.

The same subject continued.

ALTHOUGH I am of opinion that there would be no real danger of the consequences to the state govern- ments, Avhich seem to be apprehended from a power in the union to control them in the levies of money ; because I am persuaded that the sense of the people, the extreme hazard of provoking the resentments of the state govern-