Page:The Federalist, on the new Constitution.djvu/62

56 simple and efficacious, so far it must serve to answer the purposes of making the same rate of duties more productive, and of putting it into the power of the government to increase the rate without prejudice to trade.

The relative situation of these states; the number of rivers with which they are intersected, and of bays that wash their shores; the facility of communication in every direction; the affinity of language and manners; the familiar habits of intercourse; all these are circumstances that would conspire to render an illicit trade between them a matter of little difficulty; and would ensure frequent evasions of the commercial regulations of each other. The separate states, or confederacies, would be driven by mutual jealousy to avoid the temptations to that kind of trade, by the lowness of their duties. The temper of our governments for a long time to come would not permit those rigorous precautions, by which the European nations guard the avenues into their respective countries, as well by land as by water, and which even there, are found insufficient obstacles to the adventurous stratagems of avarice.

In France, there is an army of patrols (as they are called) constantly employed to secure her fiscal regulations against the inroads of the dealers in contraband. Mr. Neckar computes the number of these patrols at upwards of twenty thousand. This proves the immense difficulty in preventing that species of traffic, where there is an inland communication, and shows in a strong light the disadvantages, with which the collection of duties in this country would be incumbered, if by disunion the states should be placed in a situation with respect to each other, resembling that of France with respect to her neighbors. The arbitrary and vexatious powers with which the patrols are necessarily armed, would be intolerable in a free country.

If, on the contrary, there be but one government, pervading all the states, there will be, as to the principal part of our commerce, but to guard—the. Vessels arriving directly from foreign countries, laden with valuable cargoes, would rarely choose to expose themselves to the complicated and critical perils which would attend attempts to unlade prior to their coming into port. They would have to dread both the dangers of the coast, and of detection, as well after, as before their arrival at the places of their final destination. An ordinary degree of vigilance would be competent to the prevention of any material infractions upon the rights of the revenue. A few armed vessels, judiciously stationed and employed, might at small expense be made useful sentinels of the laws. And the government, having the same interest to provide against violations everywhere, the coöperation of its measures in each state, would have a powerful tendency to render them effectual. Here also we should preserve, by union, an advantage which nature holds out to us, and which would be re-