Page:The Emu volume 3.djvu/287

 that the horse took warning, turned round, and followed his feathered mate. Since rain came, filling waterholes and giving a spring to the grass, the Emu has relaxed in his attentions. Another blind horse has joined the first, and as both are fat and comfortable the feathered friend may think his attentions are no longer required.—Rockhampton Bulletin, 5/10/03.

— Under this title Mr. F. M. Littler, F.E.S., has, in a recent number of The Zoologist, tried to throw some light on a question which, as a section of the problem as to the dividing line between instinct and intelligence in the animal world, has engaged some of the foremost minds of the century, and concerning which the results arrived at are not too definite. Possibly our Tasmanian observer is right in considering that "in any newly-settled country or colony, where environments are constantly changing, there is a wider scope for observations on the intelligence of birds than in any highly and long cultivated area." The local instances he cites (which might be very considerably added to from Australian observations) both for and against the contention that birds do reason, involve some knotty points. But the whole question is one which will probably never be completely solved until some much more intimate knowledge be possessed of mental and psychological activities throughout their whole range. The conclusion Mr. Littler arrives at is:—"The more the subject is investigated, the firmer grows my conviction that animals (such as quadrupeds and birds) which are continually associated with man … are possessed of an intelligence and power of reasoning, small and feeble though these may be." The problem opens up a fascinating field of study, and may with advantage be investigated much further. Every reliable observation will be a help—even though the deductions drawn therefrom be merely those of analogy.

.—Writing on this subject, Dr. Jonathan Dwight, jun. (The Auk, vol. xxi., pp. 65, 66) says that "signs are not wanting at the present time that its value … is impaired by the undue prominence which it has attained. … It seems to be forgotten that the sub-species is only a convenient recognition of geographical variation within the limits of the species. … We must beware lest we name that which exists only in our expectant mind. … To name every degree of incipiency is pushing matters to a point when the name, by overshadowing the fact, ceases to be the convenient handle for which it is primarily intended. . . . We forget that, as names multiply, they lose in definiteness of meaning. It is not inconceivable that our successors may reduce our splinters to sawdust, and bestow a name upon each and every grain. . . . True science does not receive much