Page:The Elements of the China Challenge (November 2020).pdf/46



Following the Chinese Communist Party’s massacre of civilians that ended the six-week Tiananmen Square protests of 1989 and Beijing’s subsequent imposition of harsh restrictions on freedom of speech and press, U.S. administrations of both parties doubled down on a China policy focused on engagement. That policy had its justifications and brought its benefits. However, rapid modernization, prodigious economic growth, substantial progress toward building a world-class military, and integration into the world economy have not inclined China to join, let alone play its part in maintaining, the community of nations dedicated to an international order grounded in freedom, democracy, national sovereignty, human rights, and the rule of law.

To the contrary, having survived the 1989 protests, the CCP proceeded to build a hyper-modern police state based on repression and indoctrination at home and committed to predatory schemes of international trade, investment, construction, surveillance, and disinformation. Rather than yielding political liberalization, China’s outsized economic development and acquisition of international influence have given new life among the party’s faithful to the objective of forging a socialist world order with Chinese characteristics. Xi Jinping’s resolute pursuit of “the Chinese dream of national rejuvenation” has intensified the great-power competition launched by the CCP.

In one crucial respect, the China challenge resembles the one presented by the Soviet Union to the free world. Soviet authoritarianism combined communism and traditional Russian nationalism. The Soviet synthesis governed the USSR’s quest to construct a worldwide socialist order with Moscow at the center. Similarly, Chinese authoritarianism combines communism and a hyper-nationalist interpretation of China’s status and destiny. The CCP synthesis governs China’s quest to construct a worldwide socialist order with Beijing at the center.

In another crucial respect, however, the China challenge differs from the Soviet challenge. The Soviet Union primarily enlarged its dominions and sought to impose its will through military coercion. For almost fifty years, the USSR ruled over half of Europe through force Rh