Page:The Effects of Finland's Possible NATO Membership - An Assessment.pdf/7

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 * the norms and principles governing the European order. It regards the Atlantic Alliance as an adversary and considers any NATO enlargement as a threat to its national security. Hence, Russia will attempt to thwart any move by Finland or Sweden to join NATO. The historical record of previous NATO enlargements, despite the fact that Finland is not viewed by Russia in the same light as Ukraine or Georgia, indicate that political and economic reactions may be strong, even harsh, notably during the transition phase. Even while stopping short of the use of force, specific counter-measures would be difficult to predict.
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 * style="vertical-align:text-top"|DECISION-MAKING. Finland’s accession to NATO – if such were the country’s choice – would involve intricate diplomatic and political processes not least since accession would probably take place in a more charged international atmosphere than previous enlargements. Externally, there would be every reason to shorten the transition period between the membership application and admission into NATO, since this would be the time of maximum antagonism by Russia. However, even if a 'fast-track' accession process could be agreed upon by the members of NATO, it would run counter to the probable need to manage two membership processes in parallel in Finland and Sweden. These processes may involve referenda, with uncertain outcomes, which could lead to split decisions and their ensuing consequences. A possible fast track should not be allowed to interfere with the full democratic due process which such a weighty decision calls for. Indeed, an in-depth and possibly lengthy public debate has virtues of its own, if this portentous issue is not to fall prey to the froth of short-term and superficial discussion.
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 * style="vertical-align:text-top"|DECISION-MAKING. Finland’s accession to NATO – if such were the country’s choice – would involve intricate diplomatic and political processes not least since accession would probably take place in a more charged international atmosphere than previous enlargements. Externally, there would be every reason to shorten the transition period between the membership application and admission into NATO, since this would be the time of maximum antagonism by Russia. However, even if a 'fast-track' accession process could be agreed upon by the members of NATO, it would run counter to the probable need to manage two membership processes in parallel in Finland and Sweden. These processes may involve referenda, with uncertain outcomes, which could lead to split decisions and their ensuing consequences. A possible fast track should not be allowed to interfere with the full democratic due process which such a weighty decision calls for. Indeed, an in-depth and possibly lengthy public debate has virtues of its own, if this portentous issue is not to fall prey to the froth of short-term and superficial discussion.
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We can but underline how fundamental such a decision would be. It would represent a sea change in policy, which must be considered as a commitment for the long-term. A small country such as Finland has good reason to be careful when considering choices of grand strategy. THE EFFECTS OF FINLAND'S POSSIBLE NATO MEMBERSHIP ● AN ASSESSMENT