Page:The Effects of Finland's Possible NATO Membership - An Assessment.pdf/49

 the outcome of the political process by applying without a clear political mandate.

FAST TRACK? Given this background, the issue of a possible fast-track procedure would in all likelihood be discussed, whereby Article 5 commitments would be declared to operate even before Finland (and Sweden) had become full members. This would be the first time such a procedure would be used by NATO. The high degree of overall interoperability between NATO and Finland and Sweden would make this technically a straightforward option. The downside to this approach is, of course, that if there were a “no” in a referendum (as there was on the single currency in Sweden), the Alliance would be bound by the Treaty to rescind the previous decision, with the ensuing very negative consequences. The incumbent government could be accused of deserting the operating grand strategy, only to be forced to change it back once again. A publicised fast-track procedure could, in practice, and paradoxically, galvanise the membership opponents as they could claim that the Alliance was trying to prejudice the outcome of a democratic process. A fast-track procedure, while obviously important from a security standpoint, would be fraught with internal political complications.

NEIGHBOURS. No doubt, the Baltic States would view Finnish membership and extending the NATO-Russia border as contributing to shifting the tension between them and Russia to the north. Finnish accession could, as it were, entail sharing the burden of tension along a much longer NATO-Russia frontier. They would no longer, with Norway and Poland, be the only frontline states. Should Sweden also apply, this would in practical terms greatly increase the strategic depth of Baltic defence and transform the Nordic/Baltic area into a common strategic space. This would facilitate further military integration between the Baltic States and the new member(s). Defending these republics today is a logistical challenge of the first order.

What reactions could be expected from within the Alliance, should Finland and Sweden apply? Some member states on the southern tier might feel that attention could shift from their concerns to the North. Conversely, some may fear that Finland – with regard to its long border with Russia and history of trying to find a modus vivendi with its great power neighbour – would hamper efforts to oppose Moscow more robustly. Others may feel that if Finnish/Swedish membership does lead to increased tension in Europe, then the Alliance is creating more problems than it will solve; hence, they could believe that it might be better to leave things as they are. THE EFFECTS OF FINLAND'S POSSIBLE NATO MEMBERSHIP ● AN ASSESSMENT