Page:The Effects of Finland's Possible NATO Membership - An Assessment.pdf/43

 which objected publicly in the past to NATO nuclear policy, never ceased to be part of the NPG.

Members of NATO and of the NPG which do not have nuclear weapons on their territory are not expected to task their combat aircraft with nuclear strike missions. They can nonetheless play a part in the execution of such missions in the form of a fighter escort or the suppression of enemy air defences (SEAD), for instance. That is a matter of national choice, however.

COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE. Since NATO is a collective defence organisation, Finland alone or with Sweden would have the opportunity of exploiting its competitive advantage and thus be able to punch above its weight in the Alliance. Three areas (but others may exist as well) come to mind: THE EFFECTS OF FINLAND'S POSSIBLE NATO MEMBERSHIP ● AN ASSESSMENT
 * Intelligence on Russia’s eastern approaches, from the White Sea southwards. Collecting and processing intelligence is not strictly a NATO task, since intelligence is usually not traded in multilateral contexts, but it naturally serves the collective defence. As Finland moves from a primarily counter-espionage posture to a broader spectrum intelligence-gathering policy, the country’s geographical location and deep knowledge of the region will give it substantial additional leverage.
 * Cyberdefence is another, already well-recognised area of Finnish expertise. Its ongoing participation in NATO’s Centre of Excellence in Tallinn sets a significant precedent in this regard.
 * So-called “hybrid” or “ambiguous” warfare is another field in which Finland has particular expertise due to the traditional Finnish concept of comprehensive security, which aims to increase the resilience of the whole of society. Hybrid warfare has already been the object of cooperation with NATO partners. Since “little green men” and other “soldiers without insignia” would presumably not enjoy a permissive environment in Finland, it is unclear whether this is a promising area for Finland to exploit in general. It could, however, function as a convenient vehicle for intra-regional cooperation with the Baltic States or serve in a CSDP framework if the EU were to set up a Hybrid Warfare Centre.