Page:The Effects of Finland's Possible NATO Membership - An Assessment.pdf/39

 ly adequate from a NATO standpoint. Finland’s territorial defence is superior to that of the smaller Baltic States. This would be true whether Finland joins alone or with Sweden. Foreign military bases, let alone the stationing of nuclear weapons, would not be a prerequisite for the effective extension of NATO’s defence guarantee.

However, Russia may reinforce its forces in the former Leningrad Military District, notably in the Murmansk oblast and on the Karelian Isthmus, either in response to Finland and/or Sweden joining NATO, or independently of such an eventuality. Russia’s current deployment of an infantry brigade at the recently reactivated base of Alakurtti south of Murmansk demonstrates the importance Russia attaches to this particular military region, which remains a strategic nexus. This should not be overestimated however: according to the Estonian intelligence service’s most recent public report (March 2016), Russia can only field some 30 battalion-sized tactical groups in the whole of the Western Military District (from Kaliningrad to Vorkuta). Russia could also ramp up its military activities vis-à-vis Finland to levels equal or superior to those to which Sweden and NATO countries in the Baltic Sea and North Atlantic have been subjected in recent years, including simulated strategic bombing attacks on critical Swedish installations.

In NATO terms, an increased threat level vis-à-vis Finland as a NATO member would be substantially easier to handle if Sweden were also in. The ability to provide timely NATO support and reinforcements to Finland would enhance the deterrent capabilities of the Finnish force structure and limit the risks of Russian miscalculation.

Conversely, in such a contingency, a stand-alone Finnish membership could lead NATO to propose additional military measures such as the prepositioning of equipment packages along lines being implemented in the Baltics and a substantial rotational NATO presence in Finland. Such measures could also be called for in order to facilitate the defence of Estonia and the other Baltic States.

In the event of a conflict, NATO would also expect Finland to participate actively in the common defence, not least in the Baltic area: there would therefore be pressure on Finland to develop its beyond-the-borders capabilities. However, to NATO planners, Finland’s territorial defence as a tool for deterrence-by-denial would appear to be the most important direct military asset that Finland could provide for the common defence. To the THE EFFECTS OF FINLAND'S POSSIBLE NATO MEMBERSHIP ● AN ASSESSMENT