Page:The Effects of Finland's Possible NATO Membership - An Assessment.pdf/36

 CHAPTER IV. THE EFFECTS OF FULL NATO MEMBERSHIP

The effects of Finland’s possible membership will be dealt with on the basis of what mathematicians call: “the problem is considered to have been as resolved”, i.e. Finland has joined NATO, without prejudging whether this will, or should, happen. Therefore, we will avoid a balance-sheet type of presentation of liabilities and assets, of pros and cons. Conversely, some of the effects will be heavily scenario-dependent, notably in terms of the existence or absence of a more or less joint approach between Finland and Sweden.

Since NATO’s raison d’être is to provide collective defence, the defence and military effects will be examined first, followed by an assessment of the strategic and political consequences.

Before detailing these effects, it must be noted that the pace of possible accession can have effects of its own. Membership processes can be more or less prolonged, depending on the state of political decision-making in the accession country and on the view existing NATO countries have as to the desirability of, and its readiness for, full membership. The entry of post-communist states was relatively slow both because of the preference for grouped memberships (Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, in 1999; then the “Big Bang” of 2004 with seven entrants including the Baltic States) and the intrinsic difficulty of making these former Warsaw Pact countries NATO-compatible. But time was not of the essence during this strategically benign period. Nor are other post-communist states such as Albania, Croatia and currently Montenegro models for Finland in terms of meeting NATO standards.

The accession process that is possibly the most comparable to Finland or Sweden in terms of the internal political dynamics may be that of Spain. Not unlike Finland (and Sweden), the population of Spain was divided on 36