Page:The Effects of Finland's Possible NATO Membership - An Assessment.pdf/21

 tive defence planning, decision-making and military structures can only be reached via full membership. This leads to the main paradox of the NATO partnership, namely that in the worst case it can be seen in the eyes of external actors to strengthen an ever-closer association with NATO without, however, supplying the deterrence provided by Article 5.

Finland, in effect, belongs today to the inner circle of the NATO partnership. With the exception of air surveillance and control (see ), Finland is close to the limit of what a non-member can achieve with NATO. In the event of NATO membership, Finland’s territorial defence would be coherent with the Article 5 defence of the country.

The relationship between the EU and NATO. During the last few years a number of issues have pushed the relationship between the EU and NATO towards complementarity instead of rivalry. The way the political and military relationship between these two organisations is arranged is of crucial importance for Finland as it is a member of one but not of the other.

A change in the US view on the EU common security and defence policy (CSDP) has paved the way for complementarity being pursued between the EU and NATO. Since its inception in 1999 and notwithstanding its lack of progress in recent years, the CSDP has been perceived as an important framework for a stronger European military contribution to the transatlantic relationship. Although existing political and economic conditions preclude any large-scale functional overlap between the two organisations, the EU has been able to enter into fields such as the mutual defence and solidarity clauses. The fact remains, at least in the short and medium term, that the military structures and preparedness that exist in NATO will not be built within the EU.

Finland’s (and Sweden’s) possible membership of NATO would increase the overlap of membership between the EU’s and NATO’s respective membership But this would not significantly change the existing relationship between NATO and the EU. The situation would change basically only if a stable modus vivendi were established between NATO and the EU in terms of the exchange of classified information. Lack of agreement on this issue impairs even the most basic and pragmatic cooperation between NATO and the CSDP as envisioned in the 1999 ‘Berlin Plus’ agreement. Any pro- THE EFFECTS OF FINLAND'S POSSIBLE NATO MEMBERSHIP ● AN ASSESSMENT