Page:The Effects of Finland's Possible NATO Membership - An Assessment.pdf/18

 NATO’s enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe was a demanding political task which put its relationship with Russia to the test. Although the Russian leadership was never pleased with the continuing presence of NATO in the post-Cold War Europe – not to speak of its enlargement – Moscow’s reactions were political in nature, and did not lead to a strategic crisis or economic countermeasures. This was true for both the 1999 enlargement (Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary) and even for the 2004 ‘Big Bang’ (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Bulgaria, Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia). Although the Russian leadership used harsh language and threatened to impose sanctions if NATO expansion were to include the Baltic States, their accession did not cause any major worsening of their relationship with Russia.

However, Russia drew the line at Georgia and Ukraine joining NATO. Although US efforts to force the issue of membership at the 2008 NATO summit in Bucharest met with European resistance, which put the issue on indefinite hold, Russia was determined to use all means to remove the option from the table completely.

This was in contrast to Russia’s prior conduct. Indeed, NATO concluded a PfP agreement with Russia in 1994 and Russia also participated in the NATO-led IFOR and SFOR operations in Bosnia in 1995, and subsequently in Kosovo as part of KFOR in 1999–2000. To conciliate Russia with respect to NATO enlargement, the two parties raised their relationship to a new level through a specific Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security concluded in 1997. It established a permanent joint council with a coordination and consultation mechanism between Russia and NATO without, however, granting Russia a right to veto NATO decisions. The functioning of the permanent joint council was briefly suspended in spring 1999 due to disagreements over the Kosovo war but was resumed a couple of months later. The positive relations between the parties culminated in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks against the US in 2001, when the scope of cooperation was furthermore enlarged and a new NATO-Russia council was established to provide Russia with a more equal status in its cooperation with NATO (“at 29”). Russia duly served as a major logistical supply line for NATO-led forces in Afghanistan.

The full range of activities created in the framework of the NATO-Russia council did not, however, prevent the continued presence of NATO as part of Russia’s “enemy picture” (Feindbild), even in its successive post-Cold War military doctrines (1993, 2000, 2010, 2015). The Russian war against Geor- 18