Page:The Economic Journal Volume 1.djvu/805

 REVIEWS 783 that the comparative equality in incomes which it would bring about would be an equality in poverty: even supposing population not to increase at a greater rate than the present, as it must be expected to do if work and adequate sustenance were secured to all members of the community, unless measures of a novel kind were taken to prevent the increase.' .ccordingly, like the Benthamites, Dr. Sidgwick is jealous of the rights of property. He more than once observes that the proposal to confiscate existing vested interests in land is unworthy of serious discussion. However he goes so far as to admit ' that at least a removal of the extreme inequalities, found in the present distribution of wealth and leisure, would be desirable, if it could be brought about without any material repression of the free development of individual energy and enterprise, which the individualistic system aims at securing.' Especially when it is taken into account that, as above observed, property in natural resources has upon strictly individualistic principles no direct justification, some expenditure of public money on objects which may be considered socialistic is defensible 'so far as this is done without such heavy taxation as materially diminishes the stimulus to industry and thrift of the persons taxed.' It follows that the interposition of government may be required not only to increase the amount, but also to improve the distribution of wealth. Which motive predominates it is often difficult to decide. Thus the expenditure of public funds in educating the children of the labouting poor both conduces to efficiency of labour and promotes the equality of opportunity. No handy rule, no simple method for weighing the evils and advantages of governmental action, can be given. ' I do not think that any general rules can be laid down for deter- nining the limits of such interference: all we can say is that a milder de,,ree of interference, if effective, is generally to be preferred.' For example, with respect to ' the burning question of Free Trade,' it is not to be denied that it may be economically gainful to a country to resist by import duties an industrial change which might lead to the emigration of its population and wealth; and to introduce an industrial change by protecting young industries. But, as such cases are practically rare, upon the whole it is concluded that modern states had better refrain frown attempts to protect native industry, 'not because it is impossible that such protection, if judiciously introduced and limited, might not be occasionally advantageous to the protecting country, but because a really judicious protection of native industry implies a wisdom and strength on the part of government which we cannot practically expect to obtain.' Retaliatory duties are even less anenable to general rule: how far they may be advisable is 'not a question to which a general theoretical answer is possible.' We have been considering governmental regulation with reference both to production and distribution. But is not the sum total of happi- ness, the end of government, a function of the number of population as