Page:The Economic Journal Volume 1.djvu/529

Rh will not say below the rate of profits earned by the railway companies, but below that earned by other traders. The practical problem is to correct these evils with the minimum of interference—not to seek a remedy in the charlatanism of so-called scientific and really arbitrary methods; but, continuing old modes of charging, to correct a few evils which experience has disclosed. In the many controversies about the defects of railway management here is a proneness to forget its merits. Foreigners do not; they admire and envy its elasticity, efficiency, celerity, and the ease with which it has adapted itself to the requirements of modern industry. The peril of the hour appears to be that from exaggerated solicitude about giving certain traders larger profits we may by excessive interference impair these virtues.

In regard to this subject definiteness is everything. I venture to make suggestions as to some expedient corrections in legislation; it will be easier to pick holes in them if stated in detail. It may seem strange to sketch the outlines of a new Bill before the existing Act has come fully into operation. But the chief sections relating to this subject are so vague and unsatisfactory that further legislation may be soon needed.

(a) Abolition of maximum rates and statutory classifications as useless. They give the customer an appearance of protection which they do not afford; they require periodical revision if they are not to be unjust and far removed from the actual rates. (b) No interference, directly or indirectly, with rates which are the result of competition. Rates from A to X, 10s.; rates from B to X, the same distance, only 5s., there being competition by sea or otherwise. The courts have avoided clearly saying when, in such circumstances, there is undue preference. When competition really operates the excuse for interference is gone.

(c) No interference with group rates; let alone, they will be formed where they are convenient, according to the requirements of trades, and not according to the opinions of courts of law, and they may become the germs of a system of zone tariffs.

(d) Interference as heretofore with discriminations between persons really in the same circumstances; none when the value and utility of the services are different, even if the cost of performing them be the same.