Page:The Economic Journal Volume 1.djvu/441

 REVIEWS 419 passage of Polybius, that the shares were widely diffused and held in small amounts by all except the very humblest persons. But we have a difficulty in understanding how, were this the ease, we have so few allusions to this form of property among the teruiores. Nor s,n we quite go with him in estimating so highly the actual influence of the aggregated wesith. It is true that Cicero was mortally afraid of his good friends the publicani; it is true that he gives them remarkable precedence in his phrase about crones soitates, crones ordines; it is true that for many years the moneyed men (equites: a wider term than publicani) sat exclusively as jurors. But still, to speak of ' le rgne des manieurs d'argent' is too strong with regard to a eommonwesith in which we find so many other political forces freely at work. We must leave the judgment of Professor Bryce in the Contemporary Review, January, 1891, to balance the assertion that' Jamsis, b, notre avis, l'argent et ceux qui le manient n'ont exere$ sur les mceurs publiques et le gouvemement d'un pays une influence semblable b, eelle des grands speulateurs romains de eette poque.' But in any case the publicani were strong, too strong for the welfare of the world. They plundered the provinces. They avenged themselves on Lucullus. They wrought the condemnation of the just P. Eutilius Rufus. How is it that capital was so much more powerful with them than with the bankers ? For one thing, participa- tion in their enterprises was much more widely spread; spread just as far as we may think that the shares went. For another, the state would show no company, except its own contractors, so to organize itself as to be capable of finaneisi and industrial enterprises on a large scale, conducted at a distance, ,nd taking a long time. The ordinary law threw insuperable difficulties in the way of other partnerships and joint enterprises, but was relaxed in fayour of state contractors. The death or withdrawal of one member broke up every other sort of joint enterprise. These powerful and self-seeking companies had their palmy day in the last two centuries of the Republic. But their prosperity was inter- rupted by Sulla and ended by Augustus. Perhaps only a strong military usurper could have made good his position against them, and have gained time to bring about their downfall by giving up the use of middle men, and by having state business done directly through state officials. It is probable that their disappearance was regretted by few. If we could forget a long history of extortion and outrage, we should yet remember that the moneyed class at Rome (and this is true of bankers as well as contractors) showed little public spirit and seldom used their power but for selfish ends. They did no good to their world. They introduced no reforms, they taught no useful truths. They never pointed out the mistake of trying to limit the rate of interest or prevent the exportation of bullion. They never protested against plated money, injudicious taxes, or sumptuary laws. In fact they had no theory of economics, and their practice was simple rapacity. Deloume adds that 'ces moeurs, h la lois aristocratiques et rare-