Page:The Economic Journal Volume 1.djvu/105

 Rh the people by reason and not by artifice, for experience showed that a people 'tricked into an imposition, though expedient for their prosperity, will oppose violently at another time a like measure even when essential to their preservation.'

In thus guiding the citizens towards the economic ideal, the statesman was called upon to deal with purely self-regarding interests. The principle of competition is abundantly recognized throughout his treatise as usually operative in all commercial transactions. 'The best way to govern a society, and to engage everyone to conduct himself according to a plan, is for the statesman to form a system of administration, the most consistent possible with the interest of every individual, and never to flatter himself that his people will be brought to act in general, and in matters which purely regard the public from any other principle than private interest. This is the utmost length to which I pretend to carry my position. As to what regards the merit and demerit of actions in general, I think it fully as absurd to say, that no action is truly virtuous, as to affirm that none is really vicious.

'It might perhaps be expected that, in treating of politics, I should have brought in public spirit also, as a principle of action; whereas all I require with respect to this principle is merely a restraint from it, and even this is perhaps too much to be taken for granted. Were public spirit, instead of private utility, to become the spring of action in the individuals of a well-governed state, I apprehend it would spoil all. Let me explain myself.

'Public spirit, in my way oi treating this subject, is as superfluous in the governed, as it ought to be all-powerful in the statesman: at least, if it is not altogether superfluous, it is fully as much so, as miracles are in a religion once fully established. Both are admirable at setting out, but would shake everything loose, were they continue to be common and familiar. Were miracles wrought every day the laws of nature would no longer be laws: and were everyone to act for the public and neglect himself the statesman would be bewildered, and the supposition is ridiculous.

'I expect, therefore, that every man is to act for his own interest in what regards the public, and, politically speaking, every one ought to do so. It is the combination of every private interest which forms the public good, and of this the public, that is the statesmen only, can judge.'

The opposition between private interest and public good is really reduced to a minimum in such a doctrine as this, but Sir